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THE "LOYALIST PROBLEM" IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 




University of New Hampshire, September, 2008 
Traditionally, studies of the Loyalists from the American Revolution highlight their 
wartime experience or explore their post-war experience as exiles in other areas of 
the British Empire. Instead, this study begins in 1783 and focuses on the majority of 
Loyalists who stayed in the United States after Independence. Using legal 
documents, personal correspondence, and popular newspapers the "Loyalist Problem 
in the Early Republic," analyzes the legal and cultural dimensions of citizenship 
from the Loyalist's perspective. It suggests that the Loyalists played a significant 
role in the legal and cultural formation of American citizenship and national identity. 
Additionally, it explores the Loyalists role in shaping American commercial policy 




Few events in American history have captured the historian's imagination more 
than the American Revolution. From the progressive historians of Charles Beard's cohort 
at the turn of the twentieth century, through the social historians of the 1960s and now the 
post-modern/postcolonial scholars of the twenty-first century, the Revolution provides 
the locus around which the historical profession explores the development of American 
society.1 Even the loyalists, the big losers in the contest, have received adequate, if 
somewhat narrow attention. In fact, after the neo-Progressive historians displaced the old 
"consensus" school in the 1960s, historians have emphasized the internal conflicts of the 
war and most historians now characterize the Revolution as a civil conflict. 
1
 Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, (New York, 
Macmillan, 19060,c,1935), Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible, (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1979) 
Richard Ryerson, "The Revolution is now begun ": the radical committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776, 
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), when I refer to 'postmodern/postcolonial I refer in 
particular to the recent roundtable discussion in the William and Mary Quarterly led by Jack P. Greene, 
"Roundtable: Colonial History and National History: Reflections on a Continuing Problem," in William 
and Mary Quarterly, (April 2007) Of course Greene advocates a move away from treating the Revolution 
as a boundary and a barrier between the colonial and national periods but in so doing he highlights the trend 
thus far in American historiography. 
2
 John Higham classified the "consensus" school in a 1959 article for Commentary. Higham identified, 
Daniel Boorstin's The Genius of American Politics, Louis Hartz's, The Liberal Tradition in America 
(1955), David Potter's People of Plenty, (1954) and Richard Hofstadter's Age of Reform (1955) has 
members of a "consensus" approach to history. These historians smoothed over conflict in America's past 
and instead emphasized consensus and accord. The rise of the neo-progressive historians in the 1960s on 
the campus' of the University of Wisconsin and California in particular, collapsed the consensus school and 
replaced it with recognition of the vitality of disagreement in American history. Towards a New Past: 
Dissenting Essays in American History, (1967) witnessed the turning point. Barton Bernstein edited the 
eclectic collection that included Jesse Lemisch's now famous argument about "The Revolution Seen from 
the Bottom Up" and also Eugene Genovese's early work on the Old South. Emphasis on conflict in 
American history as an invigorating source of change paved the way for renewed scholarship on the 
Loyalists. The above discussion is culled from Ellen Fitzpatrick, History's Memory, (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2002) chapter five and the epilogue. 
The current dominate monographs that characterize the Revolution as a civil conflict are: Bernard Bailyn, 
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University, 
1967), ed., Jack P. Greene, The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, (New York, Harper and Row, 
1968), Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 
Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 
1969), ed., Jack P. Greene, Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789: a documentary history of the American 
2 
One consequence of interpreting the Revolution as a civil war was to encourage 
scholars to pay attention to the Loyalists. Historians sought to find answers to the 
question of motivation and demographics: why did certain individuals or certain regions 
remain loyal to the King? How was loyalty to the Crown expressed and how was it 
punished or rewarded? How powerful was the internal opposition to independence and 
why did its supporters fail? Wallace Brown initiated the current interest in the Loyalists 
in 1965 with The Kings' Friends, which is a systematic examination of the nature of 
loyalism in each of the thirteen colonies.3 The book encouraged Brown to reach the now 
universally accepted conclusion that loyalism was not a cohesive movement but varied in 
each colony in type, quantity and intensity.4 As a result, historians treated the Loyalists as 
an anomaly, a problem to investigate and explain. 
Brown's approach set the precedent for subsequent studies of the Loyalists. Most 
are sympathetic in nature and focus on pre-war time motivations and treatment of the 
Loyalists during and immediately after the War, 1765-1783.5 Most of the books are either 
Revolution, (New York, Norton, 1975), Eliga H. Gould, The Persistence of Empire; British political culture 
in the age of the American Revolution, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 2000), Andrew Jackson 
O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided; The American Revolution and the British Caribbean, (Philadelphia, 
University of Philadelphia Press, 2000). 
3 Wallace Brown, The Kings Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claims, 
(Providence, Brown University Press, 1965). Lorenzo Sabine was the first to attempt to tackle the Loyalist 
problem in 1847 with his invaluable contribution, Biographical Sketches of the Loyalists of the American 
Revolution.3 Sabine's study paved the way for interest in the losers of the Revolution and provided factual 
foundations to accelerate future study. 
4
 Brown actually made this conclusion explicit in his later book The Good Americans which drew on • 
similar sources but broadened the definition of loyalism from simply those who made financial claims for 
compensation to the "rank and file." Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, William Morrow and 
Company, 1969) 
5
 See for example, Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution, 
(Baltimore: Genealogical Pub, Co, reprint 2005), Claude Halstead Van Tyne, The Loyalists of the American 
Revolution, (Bowie, Md. Heritage Books, 1989, original 1902), Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, 
William Morrow and Company, 1969), Catherine S. Crary, The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the 
Revolution, (New York, MGraw Hill, 1973), Robert M. Calhoon, Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 
1760-1781, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). William H. Nelson, The American Tory, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, c 1961) North Callahan, Flight from the Republic, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill, 1967). A big trend in biographies of famous loyalists was also emerging in the late 1960s, see for 
3 
biographies of individual loyalists or regional case studies that offer useful, if somewhat 
biased and narrow treatment of the Loyalists.6 Additionally, scholars such as Paul H. 
Smith and John Shy tracked the military contributions of the Loyalists and their 
relationship with the British troops.7 Although many of these studies made important 
contributions, much of the work on the Loyalists was antiquarian and genealogical in 
style and not analytical nor academic enough to be integrated into the mainstream 
Q 
revolutionary narrative. The 'school' of loyalist historians remained on the periphery of 
American historiography despite its active and enthusiastic members. 
To the extent that the Loyalists exist in American historiography after 1783 it is as 
new settlers in Canada, Britain and the West Indies, not as American citizens on the 
mainland.9 In reality, only 1/5 of loyalists actually left the newly independent states after 
the Peace of Paris in 1783. The majority, as many as 413,000 remained behind and made 
example, L.F.S. Upton, The Loyal Whig: William Smith of New York and Quebec, (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1969) and slightly later Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, (Cambridge, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1974). 
The antiquarian style of many of these biographies is evident in the trade or sometimes personal 
publications rather than academic press. See for example, Eugene R. Fingerhut, Survivor: Cadwallader 
Colden IF in Revolutionary America, (Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), Brian C. Cuthbertson, Loyalist 
Governor: Biography of John Wentworth, (New Hampshire, Petheric Press, 1983) James Henry Stark, The 
loyalists of Massachusetts and the other side of the Revolution, (Boston, J.H. Stark, 1910), Robert Orley 
DeMond, The loyalists in North Carolina during the Revolution, (Hamden, Archon Books, 1964), David E. 
Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists, (New York, Garland, 1989). Robert Munro Brown's 
Ph.D. dissertation at the University of New Hampshire reflects this trend to quantify and classify the 
loyalists in a bid to make them more understandable, Robert Munro-Brown, "We deserved a better fate" 
Loyalists in Revolutionary New Hampshire (Ph.D dissertation, University of New Hampshire, 1983). 
7
 Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill, Published 
for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 
John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Civil War," in Stephen G. 
Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, Published for the 
Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1973) 
8
 Maja Jasanoff makes this point in her recent WMQ article, The Other Side of the Revolution; Loyalists in 
the British Empire." Jasanoff correctly classifies Sabine's study as genealogical as well as the On-Line 
Institute of Advanced Loyalist Studies, www.royalprovinivial.com. One might add, 
9
 See for example, Wallace Brown, The Kings Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American 
Loyalist Claims, (Providence, Brown University Press, 1965), North Callahan, Flight from the Republic, 
(Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), Mary Beth Norton, The British-Americans: The Loyalist Exile in 
England, 1774-1789, (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1972), Anne Y. Zimmer, Jonathan Boucher; 
loyalist in exile, (Detriot, Wayne State University Press, 1978). 
4 
lives for themselves in the new republic. This study responds to this missed opportunity 
in the historiography and offers a new perspective on the post-war history of the 
American loyalists. 
"The Loyalist Problem in the Early Republic" begins where most other studies 
end, on the American mainland in 1783. In contrast to previous studies, it is not solely 
about the Loyalists but addresses the themes of naturalization and international trade in 
the nineteenth century through the lens of the loyalist experience. The first scholars on 
the Loyalists sought to recover the "losers" of the Revolution and include them in the 
mainstream narrative of the war. These historians sought to re-balance the biased history 
of the Revolution and animated their studies with sympathy and respect for the losers of 
the Revolution.11 Because these historians were successful, this study looks instead at the 
legacy of the Revolution in the Early American Republic and focuses on the loyalist role 
in that legacy. To do so, it asks slightly different questions than previous work. It is less 
concerned with motives and type and instead approaches the subject from a political, 
legal and cultural perspective. How did loyalists who chose to stay in America adapt to 
the new administration? How did those Americans who supported independence react to 
these 'disloyal' citizens? Given America's continued reliance on trade with the British 
Empire after 1783, how did those who supported the Crown in the Revolution affect the 
Scholars disagree on the total number of loyalists but there is recent consensus around the 20% mark. 
According to Moses Coit Tyler John Adam's asserted that a 1/3 of the American population were loyal to 
the crown, Moses Coit Tyler, "The Party of the Loyalists in the American Revolution," in The American 
Historical Review, vol 1, (Oct 1895) 24-45. Modern scholars put the figure nearer 20% see for example, 
Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Numerical Strength," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd series, 25, (April 1968) 259-277. All of the key monographs on loyalists acknowledge that 
the majority stayed behind, see Wallace Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, Morrow, 1969) 251. 
1
' In the bibliographical essay of the The Loyalist Perception and Other Essays, Robert M. Calhoon 
characterizes the comprehensive texts on the loyalists as "sympathetic to their subjects." Bernard Bailyn 
made these bias' clear in his introduction to The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson in which he stated he was 
doing something different; "My purpose, then, is to convey something of the experience of the losers of the 
American Revolution. And I do this not because I agree with them or judge them to have been right or 
because I find them more appealing people than their opponents." X. 
5 
trade policy between the two nations? Finally, how did the growing sense of national 
pride and identity in the nineteenth century include, explain or forgive the Loyalists? 
In 1970, Wallace Brown asserted that "something of a renaissance" was taking 
place with loyalist historiography. He predicted a "golden age" of loyalist history was 
about to begin and he especially looked forward to the establishment of the Program for 
Loyalist Studies and Publications.12 George Billias echoed Brown's eagerness for 
renewed scholarship on the Loyalists, when he observed in 1972 that the Loyalists 
remained the first 'Un-Americans' in American historiography. Billias' complained that 
historians still considered Loyalists as entirely different from their patriot peers and, 
though treated seriously by historians, loyalists remained an anomaly in the historical 
record.13 
Brown's optimism was well placed but also prescient because at present, the 
Loyalists are once again enjoying a revival in American historiography. Maya Jasanoff is 
currently working on a book about the global experience of the Loyalists in exile.14 Alan 
Taylor is engaged in a study of the Loyalist exiles in Canada and their influence on 
imperial identity.15 Liam Riordan is researching four individual loyalists on four different 
continents to explore the exile experience from a global and personal perspective.16 
12
 Wallace Brown, "The View at Two Hundred Years" in Proceedings of the American Antiquarian 
Society, (Worcester, American Antiquarian Society, 1970) 47. He cited such works as William H. Nelson, 
The American Tory, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1966), L.F.S. Upton's work, Wilbur H. Seibert's 
contributions as well as North Callahan. 
13
 George A Billias, "The First Un-Americans; The Loyalists in American Historiography," George Billias 
A. and Vaughan, Alden T. ed., Perspectives on Early American History: Essays in Honor of Richard B. 
Morris, (New York; Harper & Row, 1973). 
14
 Maja Jasanoff, "The Other Side of the Revolution: Loyalists in the British Empire," William and Mary 
Quarterly, (April 2008) 
15
 Alan Taylor, "The Late Loyalists; Northern Reflections on the Early American Republic," Journal of the 
Early Republic 27 (Spring 2007). 
16
 In conversation with the author at the New England Historical Association Conference, (Northeastern 
University, Boston, April 26). 
6 
As with the work of these scholars, this thesis focuses on the post 1783 
experience and shares the interest in the political and cultural legacy of the loyalists. 
However, this study looks at the loyalists who remained in the newly independent United 
States rather than those exiled by the new republic. Although it shares the interest in the 
contributions the Loyalists made to American history, it looks beyond the traditional 
temporal boundaries of 1775-1783 to assess how far their influence reached. It builds on 
Oscar Zeichner and David E. Maas' attention to what happened to remaining and 
returning Loyalists on the American mainland. Both Zeichner and Maas focused on 
regional case studies: New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts.17 This study attempts 
to broaden that analysis to a national level and from a legal and political angle rather than 
the bibliographic approach Maas adopts. 
Chapter One looks specifically at the problem of dual allegiance and the question 
of citizenship from a legal and cultural perspective. Using the definition of loyalists 
articulated in the Treaty of Paris (1783), this study analyzes the extent to which 
Americans at the local level accepted these definitions. New York, Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts will act as case studies to represent how Americans interpreted and 
implemented the treaty. Public broadsides written by Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin 
Rush reveal the division within the states on how to interpret the language of the treaty 
and the identity of loyalists. The chapter draws attention to the duality of the loyalists' 
allegiance in the Revolution and suggests this duality explains the continued problem of 
legal definitions in the 1780s. It traces individual experiences such as those of Tench 
17 
Oscar Zeichner, "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut," in New England Quarterly XI, 
(June, 1938) 308-330, Oscar Zeichner, "The Loyalist Problem in New York After the Revolution," 
New York History, XXI (1940)David E. Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists 1775-
1790," (New York, Garland, 1989). 
7 
Coxe and Peter Van Schaack to illuminate the personal experience of the law. The role of 
the loyalty oath and its use against the loyalists in the revolutionary and into the national 
period reinforces how Americans contested the legal status of loyalists. Chapter one 
suggests that the individual loyalists who were allowed to return or remain in their 
communities all brought with them economic prosperity and skills useful to the 
community. This sense of "usefulness, " of civic virtue and its influence on the meaning 
of American citizenship is re-visited again in chapter three from the perspective of 
memory. 
Chapter Two asses the loyalist problem from the standpoint of foreign trade. In 
1972, Charles Ritcheson asserted that the loyalists had little influence on British or 
American policy after 1783. This chapter offers a different perspective based on analysis 
of British and American trading policy in the 1780s and the 1790s. The two treaties of the 
period, Paris (1783) and Jay's (1796) supply the legal anchors governing the era. 
Navigation and shipping rights continued to generate hostility between Britain and 
America as the former mother country refused to grant American vessels permission to 
trade with the West Indies. The role loyalist merchants in the West Indies played in 
subverting British trade restrictions is explored and the chapter asserts that the Loyalist 
merchants in the West Indies actually benefited the American and West Indian economy. 
In doing so, it challenges Charles Ritcheson's assertion that loyalists were insignificant in 
the new republic. Additionally, it highlights the political and commercial links between 
the Early Republic and those areas of the British Atlantic still in the colonial period and 
emphasizes the importance of the loyalists in this relationship. 
8 
Chapter Three shifts the emphasis from the Confederation period to the heart of 
the Early Republic (1805-1850). It revisits the question of citizenship explored in chapter 
one and the issue of navigation investigated in chapter two. The War of 1812 supplies the 
locus around which these ideas of naturalization and the problem of navigation collide. In 
contrast to the legal emphasis in the first two chapters, this section addresses the problem 
of the loyalists from a cultural perspective. It is concerned solely with the memory of 
loyalists rather than the actions of living loyalists. This approach offers an angle on how 
Americans in the Early Republic remembered the internal divisions during the 
Revolution and how they used them positively to develop the meaning of American 
citizenship. It looks at the ways newspapers and magazines rehabilitated infamous 
loyalists or "Tories" from the Revolution as useful American citizens. Magazines used 
individual loyalists as models to demonstrate how American citizenship was to be earned 
through merit rather than a de facto right of birth.18 Political parties in the Early Republic 
also used the memory of the first "Un-Americans" as a political insult to the party 
opposition. The chapter explores the similarities between the partisan divisions loyalists 
The chapter subscribes to David Waldstreicher and Simon P. Newman's definition and use of popular 
print culture. In "Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent," Waldstreicher proposes that the coverage of national 
parades, fetes, and celebrations in print played an integral role in communicating feelings of consensus and 
national unity to communities across the New Republic. He argues that it was the replication of such events 
in newspapers, magazines and almanacs, which strengthened and developed a unique American identity 
and nationality. The same principle is applied here to the presentation of Tories in print as an example of 
what American readers were encouraged to regard as fundamentally un-American. David Waldstreicher, 
"Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent: Celebrations, Print Culture and the Origins of American Nationalism," 
in The Journal of American History, 82, no.l (1995) David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: 
the making of American Nationalism 1776-1820, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
Simon P. Newman, Parades and Politics of the Street, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1998).I have also drawn on Elizabeth L.Eisentein's understanding of written communication as especially 
influential in effecting the 'hearts and minds' of readers. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change; 
communications and cultural transformations in early modern Europe, (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1979). Jennifer Tebbe's definition of print culture as both 'economic commodity and cultural agent' 
has also been instructive - this paper ascribes to her assertion that a society's culture is created and 
maintained through the books, magazines and newspapers it generates, Jennifer Tebbe, "Print and 
American Culture" in American Quarterly, 32, 3 (1980) 259-279. Finally, Benedict Anderson's Imagined 
Communities; Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London; New York, Verso, 2006) 
linked the use of print culture to the much bigger picture of national identity. 
9 
caused in the Revolution and its immediate aftermath with the discords the memory of 
the loyalists created between political parties in the early nineteenth century. For 
example, during the War of 1812 the Democratic-Republicans co-opted the term "Tory" 
to fire as an insult against the Federalist party opposition. The terms connotations with 
the internal enemies of the Revolution undermined the Federalists by classifying them as 
enemies to American liberty and sovereignty. The chapter continues to trace the political 
use of the term through the 1820s and the 1830s. Consequently, this section shows that 
the loyalists continued to act as a vibrant cultural force in the Early Republic. 
Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that the history of the loyalists is not simply a 
history of losers or disaffected aristocrats. Nor is it a history of ideology or motivation 
during a time of civil conflict. It need not be reduced to a list of names and professions 
but can illuminate the story of naturalization, navigation and the meaning of American 
citizenship from the Revolution through the early nineteenth century. 
10 
Chapter 1 
Internal Exiles: "Disloyal Citizens" or "Illegal aliens:" The Loyalists 
and American citizenship 1783-1790 
In 1775, British ships sailed from the ports of Boston, New York, 
and Charleston with loyalists aboard seeking refuge in other parts of the 
Empire. It seemed to many observers at the time and to historians now a 
mass departure: Abigail Adam's described the first ships that left Boston 
as akin to a forest with "upward of one hundred and seventy sail 
counted." More recently, North Callahan described the exits as 
"hopeless confusion" and captured the mood of the time by citing a 
popular rhyme of the period, "The Tories with their brats and wives/Have 
fled to save their wretched lives." Susannah Well's personal diary of the 
experience reinforces the reality of such an image as she shared her "joy, 
so truly [to be] in the wide Ocean out of the dominion of Congress."21 It is 
certainly romantic to picture as Callahan does, "the last hectic days of 
peace [as if] everybody, the whole world, moved to Nova Scotia."22 
Although such romanticism has characterized many studies of the 
Loyalists, the statistics simply do not support the notion of an exodus. 
I am grateful to Eliga Gould for this phrase which he used to describe the loyalists that remained within 
the U.S after the Treaty of Paris in his comments on Maya Jasanoffs "The Other Side of the Revolution: 
Loyalists in the British Empire," (a paper presented at the MHS Early American Seminar, Thursday 
February 7th, 2008). 
20
 Charles Halstead Van Tyne, Loyalists in the American Revolution, (Bowie, Heritage Books, 1989) 58-59, 
21
 Susannah Wells, The Journal of a Voyage from Charleston to London, (New York, Arno Press, 1968) 4. 
22
 North Callahan, Flight from the Republic, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1967) 27, 30. 
11 
The most reliable sources available indicate that the majority of 
Loyalists actually remained in the United States after independence. 
Although there is some disagreement on actual figures Paul H. Smith's 
calculations have been the most accurate to date. Smith argues there were 
513,000 loyalists in America from 1775-1783 and most scholars agree 
with Charles Ritcheson's findings that somewhere between 60,000 and 
100,000 loyalists left the U.S. in exile. That leaves a minimum of 413,000 
loyalists in the newly independent U.S.24 These figures, distributed 
throughout the country may not have constituted a significant threat to the 
almost 3,000,000 strong American population but are a number larger than 
the neglect of loyalists in the historiography indicates.25 This remains an 
unexplored yet significant detail in the scholarship on loyalists. How did 
413,000 loyalists adapt to the new republic? What was their legal status 
and how did this translate to their social standing and integration into the 
community? 
Scholars disagree on the total number of loyalists but there is recent consensus around the 20% mark. 
According to Moses Coit Tyler John Adam's asserted that a 1/3 of the American population were loyal to 
the crown, Moses Coit Tyler, "The Party of the Loyalists in the American Revolution," in The American 
Historical Review, vol 1, (Oct 1895) 24-45. Modern scholars put the figure nearer 20% see for example, 
Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Numerical Strength," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd series, 25, (April 1968) 259-277. All of the key monographs on loyalists acknowledge that 
the majority stayed behind, see Wallace Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, Morrow, 1969) 251. 
24
 Charles Ritcheson, "Loyalist Influence on British Policy towards the United States After the American 
Revolution," Eighteenth Century Studies, 7, (Autumn, 1972) 1-17. See Smith's article above for those 
figures, 269. 
Smith, 269. On the marginalization of loyalists from the historiography see George A. Billias,. "The 
First Un-Americans: The Loyalists in American Historiography," in ed., Billias George A. and Vaughan, 
Alden T. Perspectives on Early American History: Essays in Honour of Richard B. Morris, New York: 
1973. 
26
 The regional studies of Connecticut and New York by Oscar Zeichner and of Massachusetts by David E. 
Maas are an exception to this rule, Oscar Zeichner, "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut," in 
New England Quarterly XI, (June, 1938) 308-330, Oscar Zeichner, "The Loyalist Problem in New York 
After the Revolution," New York History, XXI (1940), David E. Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts 
Loyalists, (New York, Garland, 1989). 
12 
This chapter explores three legal documents of this period and their 
application to the loyalists in order to offer possible answers to the above 
questions: articles V and VI of The Treaty of Paris 1783, the Test Laws of 
1777 and their development into the first Naturalization Law of 1787. 
Consideration of the role of Loyalty Oaths helps trace the principle of 
allegiance and its applications across the colonial, revolutionary and early 
national periods. These oaths permeate the boundary between legal and 
social regulations of citizenship. They can demonstrate the disparity 
between the legal and social criteria for citizenship and expose the 
contested status of the Loyalists in the early national period. 
Each document has broad implications, although their impact on 
and influence by Loyalists will remain the main focus of this discussion 
The argument shows how each document adds a perspective to the issue of 
loyalist identity, how British subjects, specifically those whose allegiance 
to America was in doubt, made the transition to American citizens. In 
addition, the individual experiences of loyalists such as Tench Coxe and 
Peter van Schaack illuminate the personal application of the law. 
* * * 
In order to assess the status of loyalists after the Revolution, it is 
first important to outline how the American rebels identified and punished 
loyalists during the War. Initially, many loyalists actually supported 
colonial resistance to British aggravations such as the Stamp and Sugar 
Acts. Indeed, most individuals who came to be known as 'Loyalists' 
13 
advocated increased American representation in Parliament and resented 
Britain's interference in the internal workings of colonial government. 
The Reverend Samuel Seabury, an outspoken loyalist, concisely described 
this duality as follows, "Many loyalists.. .had not been much happier with 
British policies since 1763 but whatever their discontent they stopped 
short of rebellion."28 James Allen, a member of the well-respected Allen's 
of Pennsylvania also admitted, "I love the cause of liberty but cannot 
heartily join in the prosecution of these measures [that are] totally foreign 
to the original plan of resistance."29 The case of Samuel Johnson 
exemplifies both of these descriptions: Johnson ultimately supported the 
Crown and maintenance of the status quo, but during the chaotic years 
following the implementation of the Stamp Act in 1765 he sat on the board 
of the Stamp Act Congress and advocated the colonist's right to be free 
from parliamentary taxation.30 From the outset of rebellion then, loyalists 
experienced a duality of allegiance and identity which both compromised 
and complicated their social and political relationships. 
Consequently, the classification of "Loyalist" as an outright 
dissenter to the American cause and champion of the King did not fall into 
official use until the introduction of the Test Act in 1777. The 
Committee's of Safety and Justices of the Peace administered the Act in 
Brown, The Good Americans, passim, Van Tyne, 8-11 & appendix A. 27 
28
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each colony. As a result, the ways of identifying loyalism in each colony 
T 1 
were slightly different, though all were based on similar principles. In 
Massachusetts, "persons suspected of being inimical to the cause of the 
colony" had to take the Test Act. In New York an individual who 
displayed a "neutral or equivocal; character" was listed, and in 
Pennsylvania one needed only to be "suspected of being unfriendly" to be 
required to take the Test.32 The 'Test' usually involved performing and 
signing an oath of allegiance to the colonies and renouncing all affiliation 
to the King.33 Such recitals often took place in the local court house with 
the Committee of Safety or a Justice of the Peace overseeing the 
procedure. Some colonies allowed local civilians to attend, watch and 
pressure individuals into signing. Punishment varied from colony to 
colony and became more severe as the war progressed. The most popular 
forms of retribution for really "conspicuous" or outspoken Tories was 
banishment, either to British occupied territory within the colonies or to 
another part of the Empire - all of which the accused paid for out of his 
own pocket. The case of the Philadelphia Quakers, who were exiled to 
Virginia, bears witness to the format and power of the Test Act and the 
significance of the Loyalty Oath as a measure of allegiance. 
31
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Harold Hyman has elegantly documented how ingrained the idea of 
loyalty oaths were in colonial American culture. They began as a tool of 
the British Empire to secure allegiance to the Crown and served as 
"prerequisites for suffrage, office-holding, and naturalization." During 
the Revolution, however, the patriots appropriated the oath. It had the 
same basic principles, but a different subject of allegiance. In September 
1777, the Philadelphia Committee on Safety deemed Israel Pemberton, 
Samuel Pleasants and twenty other individuals "inimical to the cause of 
the United States." They were imprisoned in Philadelphia until they agreed 
to sign the oath.36 The narrative tells us that Pemberton and the other 
exiles' behaviour was considered hostile as they refused to recognize the 
authority of the Committee of Safety. This Committee demanded they 
agree not to write, speak or act against the Continental Congress as well as 
"not depart from [their] dwelling house," which was the point of 
contention for the Quakers who considered themselves innocent.37 Despite 
the legal remonstrance by the accused against their arrest and the 
Committees' demands, their refusal to take the oath equaled guilt. 
Although deemed slightly 'less treasonous' than outright conspiracy, 
refusal to take the oath still carried punitive measures. In this case, the 
punishment was arrest, interrogation and a sentence of internal exile within 
the town of Stoughton, Virginia "to be treated according to their characters 
Hyman, To Try Mens Souls, chapters 1-3, quote 59. 
Thomas Gilpin, Exiles in Virginia, (Philadelphia, C.Sherman Printers, 1848) 268-269. 
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and stations."38 Ultimately, the twenty proscribed individuals were 
imprisoned for eight months from September 1777 to April 1778. 
Congress released them after deciding their behaviour was no longer 
"inimical" and George Washington recognized their refusal to take the 
oaths as conscientious objection rather than seditious intent.39 
Of course, the case of the Quakers as conscientious objectors is not 
perhaps representative of the whole. More typical was the Revered Jacob 
Baileys' banishment experience, showing how the states identified loyalty 
to the Crown, ordered individuals into exile, confiscated their property, 
stripped them of voting rights and all other privileges of citizenship.40 As 
minister of the Parish of Pownalborough in Maine Bailey enjoyed a 
prominent and influential role in a vibrant and active community. Yet his 
actions during the crucial years of 1775-1777 gave the local Committee of 
Safety cause for concern. Bailey was accused of conducting seditious 
sermons, of praying for the King and was found guilty of refusing to read 
the Declaration of Independence. As a result he was called in front of the 
Committee for investigation on two separate occasions, yet was able to 
convince them of his moral obligation to honor his allegiance to the King. 
Although he was not technically proscribed in the Test Act, Bailey was 
'asked to leave' and did so after several "molestations."41 He departed for 
Gilpin, Exiles in Virginia, 124. 38 
39
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Nova Scotia in the summer of 1779. According to Sabine he arrived there 
destitute, his face "meagre with famine and wrinkled with solicitude.' 
His property in Pownalborough was confiscated and sold for profit; he was 
stripped of the right to vote or hold office and consequently he never 
returned.43 These individuals found guilty of seditious acts, experienced 
disenfranchisement and disempowerment. Obviously, subscription to the 
oath was open to abuse and there is evidence that many loyalists who 
stayed in the colonies survived by taking the oath of allegiance 
hypocritically.44 While this might seem to challenge consideration of them 
as loyalists, the way in which their contemporaries in the new republic 
continued to treat them as Tories justifies attention to their experience.45 
The process of monitoring loyalty and classifying "inimical 
behaviour" that culminated in the Test Acts of 1777 actually began more 
formally three years earlier when the First Continental Congress was 
established in 1774. The subsequent Articles of Association, which 
included a colony wide boycott movement on British imports, provided the 
first opportunity for tangible evidence of disloyalty. The colonists viewed 
refusal to adhere to the non-importation of British goods as a visible sign 
of dissent against the colonial cause. Patriots considered non-adherence as 
a breach of the "sacred ties of virtue, honour and love of country."46 It 
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made dissent incredibly visible as thousands of copies of the Articles of 
Association were printed and published up and down the colonies; refusal 
to sign or outright flouting of the agreement was deemed the act of a Tory 
and identified as "inimical" or "equivocal" or "unfriendly" behaviour.47 
Importantly, it was not yet an act of treachery as the "country" 
referred to in the Articles was actually Britain and the signers still 
considered themselves, "his majesty's most royal British subjects." 
Consequently, punishments for the inimical acts against the Associations' 
Resolves were administered on a social rather than legal level. 
Committeemen were instructed to publicize the traitor, "that all such foes 
to the rights of British-America may be publicly known and universally 
condemned." Newspaper editors played an important role in this 
humiliation process as they published the names of merchants who were 
caught flouting the Associations agreement. Such merchants then endured 
not only the poisonous reputation of disloyalty but faced the wrath of the 
Sons of Liberty. 49 This wrath expressed itself most often and most 
venomously through the practice of American charivari; tar and feathering, 
the most common form of public retaliation and humiliation in which 
supporters of the Crown were literally covered in boiling hot tar and 
smothered in feathers. In Boston, one of the most severe colonies towards 
disloyalty, the mob set one victim Owen Richards alight after applying the 
Van Tyne, Loyalists in the American Revolution, 72. 
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tar and feathers.50 Indeed, Boston was the hub of tarring and feathering 
with a self-proclaimed committee for the purpose advertising its services 
through the city.51 In New York, another colony considered "harshest" in 
treatment of loyalists, Edward Short was tarred and feathered for refusing 
to sign the Articles of Association. In the same state, Samuel Seabury's 
published tract against the Continental Congress' resolves was publicly 
tarred, feathered and burned.52 Property as well as people was a target of 
punishment for equivocal acts. 
The attacks generally took place in public and as historian 
Benjamin Irvin suggests, "were designed to shame the victim by holding 
him up to the derision of the crowd."53 Initially tar and feathering was 
committed against highly visible forms of imperial power such as Stamp 
Act Officers, imperial Governors or anyone who represented British power 
in the colonies. Nevertheless, as the revolution progressed the practice 
was adapted and implemented against any individual who seemed to favor 
parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, as Irvin's study shows by 1775 it was 
no longer a punishment "reserved for imperial custom officials or colonial 
informants [but was] meted out to loud mouth lads trumpeting un-patriotic 
50
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beliefs." The number of victims of the custom increased as the 
Continental Congress increased monitoring individual loyalty. 
In this somewhat arbitrary system of identifying and punishing 
loyalists, the severity of retribution by public humiliation obviously 
depended on the demographics of each colony. This involved the number 
of loyalists in a region, how active or vocal they were in their support of 
the Crown and also the character of the committeemen themselves. New 
York and South Carolina were the "harshest" in their treatment of 
loyalists, due probably to the high proportion of loyalists to the patriot 
population. Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania also fall under 
the "harsh" category, with the rest of the thirteen states making up the 
"light" and "lightest" treatment of those loyal to the King.56 As the war 
intensified it became important to adopt a more universal and standardized 
system of recognizing and disciplining internal enemies. 
The transition from an act characterized as unfavourable and 
disloyal to the Articles of Association to one condemned as an illegal act 
of treachery against the United Colonies paved the way for formalization 
of this law and enactment of the Test Acts. The legal and conceptual shift 
became possible after the execution of a man named Thomas Hickey and 
the subsequent publication of the Declaration of Independence. In May of 
1776, Continental soldier Thomas Hickey became the first individual 
executed for treason against America when his role in a plot to aid the 
Irvin, "Tar, Feathers," 198. 
Brown, Good Americans, 129. 
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British army stationed on Long Island was uncovered. The plan was to 
burn the Kings Bridge, the main attack route for the Americans to Long 
Island and destroy American ships along that section of the east coast.57 A 
counterfeit ring was also at the heart of the conspiracy, Hickey and several 
other men were in league with the British Governor ,William Tryon, to 
CO 
diminish the value of continental currency. Indeed, financial gain rather 
than any sincere ideological allegiance to the British seemed to be 
Hickey's motivation. In fact, his final testimony reads like a young, naive 
immigrant who was susceptible to bad influence and made poor decisions; 
"Upon my arrival in this city I was led into bad company by William 
Green.. .1 was not acquainted with those that laid the plan, but was 
promised reward of money. I received two shillings from Green and three 
from Forbes and they promised that I should be supplied from others.. ."59 
Hickey then was not an ardent supporter of the King, nor a real political 
threat but his case set a significant precedent for those who did align 
themselves with the British. 
Hickey's indictment transformed the meaning of treachery in 
America from a crime against the King to a crime against Congress and 
each individual colony.60 To return to an earlier example, trading or 
57
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consuming British goods was now an act of treason against the United 
Colonies rather than an unsatisfactory subversion of colonial agreement. 
This was a crucial development, as it presaged the publication of the 
Declaration of Independence just one month later in July 1776. Hickey's 
case helps to explain the context of the Declaration's specific and virulent 
remonstrance against the king.61 The exposure of an internal plot of 
sedition helped colonists distance themselves even further from the mother 
country and strengthened a sense of colonial solidarity that ultimately 
enabled them to renounce allegiance to the King.62 The formalization of 
treachery as a crime against the United Colonies further compromised a 
Tory's standing in America and makes the high number of Loyalists who 
stayed even more surprising and in need of explanation. Treachery was a 
concept the Loyalist presence helped define, yet also one that further 
contested their legal and social standing in their communities during the 
war and also in the future. 
In addition, Hickey's case formalized how patriots defined and 
punished loyalty across all 13 colonies. In response to Hickey's crime, 
George Washington called for a universal application of the loyalty oath to 
be required of all civilians, "every state must fix upon some oath or 
affirmation of allegiance, to be tendered to all inhabitants without 
of Treason, (Seattle, University of Washington, 1964) 35. This was also a significant shift as until this point 
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exception and to outlaw those that refuse it."63 The cases of Jacob Bailey 
and the Philadelphia Quakers discussed above illustrate the impact of 
Washington's vision. The loyalty oath itself was not new as it was always 
a feature of colonial life and was also administered in the army and 
required of individuals holding civic office during the revolution. However 
its transition to ordinary civilians in 1774 signalled the intensity of the 
conflict and reflected the impact of loyalist dissent on the American 
imagination. 
It is clear the legal and social identity of loyalists during the 
Revolution was defined but still vulnerable to interpretation by colonial 
governments. The definitional question of "inimical" behaviour ensured 
each colony could treat its seditious inhabitants as they wished albeit 
within the boundaries of the national framework of the Test Act. In 
addition, the Treaty of Paris of 1783 largely determined the issue of 
Loyalist's legal and social identity after the Revolution. 
Although the Treaty declared peace official between Britain and 
America its impact on and for loyalists was more complicated and far 
reaching than its legal stipulations might suggest. In theory, peace brought 
with it an end to dual allegiances. An individual could no longer stay 
neutral nor switch allegiance as the situation allowed but had to choose to 
which side to 'belong.' As Alexander Hamilton observed at the time, "All 
inhabitants who were subjects under the former government and who did 
Hyman, To Try Mens Souls, 85. 
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not withdraw themselves upon the change which took place, were to be 
considered citizens, owing allegiance to the new government."65 As 
detailed in the introduction, many loyalists already expressed their identity 
at the start or near the beginning of the Revolution by moving to a 
different part of the British Empire. However, for those that chose to stay 
their national identity was decided on September 3r when the treaty was 
signed. James Kettner whose work on American citizenship remains the 
most thorough and persuasive described this process as "volitional 
allegiance;" an individual chose their identity by deciding on a location to 
inhabit at the time the treaty was signed.66 Interestingly, this process 
actually required less volition than the traditional practice of loyalty oaths. 
In contrast to taking part in mass ceremonies or swearing allegiance in 
writing in front of a committee of ones peers, simply being in the place in 
which you wanted to be a citizen seems remarkably straightforward. 
Careful analysis of articles V and VI of the treaty and attention to the 
debates over the issue in New York paint a more complex picture as it 
highlights the disparity between the legal document and its practical 
application to internal exiles in a social setting. 
Article V represented the interests of loyalists who proscribed by 
the Committees under the Test Act and were banished and/or their 
property was confiscated. It required the united colonies to allow loyalists 
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to return "unmolested" within twelve months to try and regain any 
property that was confiscated.67 In theory this sounded attainable, yet in 
practice the wording was too vague and the sentiment against loyalists too 
strong to enable the legal stipulations to be honored in practice. The states 
were not required to return confiscated property but "earnestly 
recommended'' to, therefore most states were not especially responsive to 
such recommendations.68 British Consul Phineas Bond's persistent 
petitions to Congress demonstrate the frustration and ineffectiveness of the 
law.69 Moreover, Bond's correspondence with Thomas Jefferson 
highlighted the weakness of Article V as Jefferson condescendingly asked 
Bond if he "must explain the semantic difference between 
"recommending" and "enacting?"70 The definitional problem clearly 
persisted through the Revolution into the new republic. Article V was 
designed to govern loyalists who left the United States but did so largely 
unsuccessfully. North Carolina for example continued to sell confiscated 
loyalist estates until 1790 and New York passed several discriminatory 
laws after the signing of the Treaty.71 In New Jersey the property of 
proscribed Tories such as Benjamin Thompson, Oliver DeLancey and 
Phillip Kearney was auctioned to the highest bidder after the treaty was 
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endorsed. Georgia also chose to make a profit from the lands of listed 
loyalists such as Sir James Wright and John Graham rather than uphold the 
treaty. Andrew Allen of Pennsylvania was also unable to find restitution 
for his property sold by Pennsylvania despite treaty stipulations.72 
In contrast, Article VI protected against future confiscations or 
punishment of an individual for their actions during the war, "no person 
shall suffer any future loss.. .either in person, liberty or property for their 
actions during the present war." By definition then it covered loyalists 
whose behaviour during the revolution had not been 'conspicuous' or 
threatening enough to banish or proscribe them. But it did govern 
individuals whose allegiance to America was in question and who were 
therefore vulnerable to retroactive retribution: the internal exiles of this 
chapter. The American interpretation of Articles V and VI is particularly 
instructive for determining whether loyalists who chose to stay in the 
United States were understood to be protected by their status in the treaty. 
Alexander Hamilton's debate over the issue of loyalist identity and 
allegiance in A Letter from Phocion serves as microcosm of the debate and 
helps to to clarify the opinion in New York. Benjamin Rush's treatise on 
the situation in Philadelphia will illuminate similar tensions between the 
legal status of loyalists and their treatment in the community. 
A Letter from Phocion published in 1784 addressed "The 
Considerate Citizens of New York on the Politics of the Day."73 Hamilton 
Callahan, Flight from the Republic, 121. 
Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion, (Boston, 1784) Early American Imprints Online. 
adopted the persona of Phocion, "The Good" Greek statesmen who 
advocated honesty and fairness as the lynchpins of civic virtue.74 The 
persona was relevant for this address to the citizens of New York, the 
"harshest" state for loyalist punishment. In the letter, Hamilton encouraged 
his fellow citizens to adopt a conciliatory and forgiving attitude to 
remaining and returning loyalists. Indeed, the fact Hamilton wrote the 
letter at all suggests that New Yorkers were not honoring Article V and VI 
of the Treaty of Paris, which again highlights the disparity between the 
loyalists' legal status and their social acceptance. Hamilton based his 
argument on three main points: the importance of adhering to international 
law, of honoring the ideology of the revolution and maintaining a healthy 
domestic economy. This last point is particularly interesting as the case 
studies discussed in the next section suggest that those Loyalists who were 
permitted to stay or return were able to based on their economic viability. 
Hamilton counselled New Yorkers to remember independence was 
fought for "legal liberty" against tyranny and thus, illegal acts of 
retribution against loyalists were inherently anti-revolutionary.75 By 
confiscating property or refusing to return previously confiscated land, 
Americans were tyrannizing individuals and subverting the loyalists' 
liberty that was conferred to them in law. Hamilton clearly regarded the 
Treaty of Paris as the definitive legal document defining and protecting 
loyalist identity and rights. This fed neatly in to Hamilton's strongest 
74
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argument for loyalists reintegration based on international law. In 
Hamilton's view the law worked on two levels: the first was dictated by 
natural law and the second by the Law of Nations and the Treaty of Paris 
in particular.76 Accordingly, property confiscations were totally illegal in 
Hamilton's understanding and failure to uphold the treaty specifications 
damaged America' international reputation. For Hamilton, the treaty 
defined the legal status of the loyalists. Honoring the treaty was essential 
in gaining respect as an independent nation and in retaining moral 
superiority over Britain. It is a brilliantly composed piece, designed to 
provoke a sense of guilt but also the desire to redeem; "it remains for us to 
justify the revolution by its fruits.. .Let those in whose hands it is placed 
pause for a moment and contemplate with an eye for reverence, the vast 
trust committed to them."77 Hamilton obviously regarded the Treaty of 
Paris as the definitive answer to loyalist legal identity, yet Isaac Ledyard a 
physician and health officer for the Port of New York disputed Hamilton's 
position. Their public discourse printed in the press at the time highlights 
the tension over the legal status of the loyalists in the aftermath of 
independence. 
This debate fore grounded the question of how the new republic 
would classify loyalists. Crucially, the crux of the debate was not whether 
the treaty governed the loyalists but if they were in fact American citizens. 
Hamilton and Isaac Ledyard using the pseudonym "Mentor," engaged in a 
Hamilton, "Letter from Phocion,"6-8. 
Hamilton, "Second Letter," 43-44. 
heated debate over whether loyalists were considered "aliens," or "disloyal 
citizens" in American law.78 The 'war of words' illustrates the divided 
opinion in New York and the intensity of feeling over the question of 
loyalist citizenship. Hamilton favored the latter interpretation, arguing that 
individuals covered by both Article V and VI were American citizens, "All 
inhabitants who were subjects under the former government, and who did 
not withraw themselves upon the change which took place [July 4 1776] 
were to be considered citizens, owing allegiance to the new 
government."79 In Hamilton's understanding, article V referred to 
American citizens because anyone whose property was confiscated was 
guilty of treason of one level or another. Hamilton asserted this meant by 
definition they were "disloyal citizens" not "aliens" because one cannot, 
he suggested be guilty of treason against a government you don't owe 
on 
allegiance to. Indeed, in Hamilton's view the fact that loyalists were 
charged with treason for supporting the British attests to their status as 
citizens of America rather than illegal aliens. 
In contrast, Ledyard asserted the Treaty of Paris applied only to 
those Loyalists who left during the war and did neither govern nor protect 
loyalists who remained, "But I can find nowhere.. .that any of the three 
classes may dwell among us, and enjoy the immunities and privileges of 
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citizens."81 For Ledyard "real British subjects" as article V addressed, 
were those whose allegiance to the King was so strong they left or were 
forced to leave America. Ledyard focused most of his energy on refuting 
Hamilton's suggestion that Loyalists would be instrumental in developing 
American trade and commerce. He rejected the notion that "by removing 
these people we remove a great part of the gold and silver from this state," 
as he argued "money is a conveniency, not an article of trade, wherever 
trade centers, money will." Ledyard's emphasis on the commercial 
argument suggests one of two things. Either New Yorkers were more 
concerned about the presence of Loyalists in trade networks than their 
legal status or it simply reflects his own area of expertise as an officer at 
the Port of New York. 
The question of why the qualification for American citizenship was 
so crucial, is easier to understand given the observations of Morris 
Birkbeck, who recorded his travels through North America in 1818. 
Birkbeck noted that the highest compliment a man could be paid was to be 
called a "good citizen." It was a phrase that carried with it connotations of 
virtue and morality, and seems, at least in Birkbeck's observations to have 
been widely known and used.82 Moreover, it was not simply a curious 
traveller's exaggeration, nor was it confined to the early nineteenth 
century. The question of what it meant to be a citizen in the Early Republic 
was on many American minds in the inchoate decades immediately 
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following the Peace of Paris. George Washington's personal sacrifices for 
the sake of the public good were promoted as the epitome of civic virtue. 
Benjamin Rush counselled fellow Philadelphians to aspire to the virtuous 
qualities of hard work, frugality and dependability.84 In fact, the concept of 
American citizenship quickly became synonymous with the personal 
qualities of honor and courage; a man earned his citizenship by living up 
to these ideals.85 
In this context, the status of citizenship for those individuals who 
had sided with the Crown was thus an ambiguous and vulnerable playing 
field. The debate over the proposed repeal of the Test Act in Pennsylvania 
further illuminates the complexity of Loyalists legal and social identity in 
the new republic. In 1784, the Pennsylvania legislature reasserted its 
loyalty oath from 1777, which specified that no one who had shown 
allegiance to the King in the "late war" was qualified to vote or hold 
office.86 Moreover, the act proposed that all male inhabitants who had 
failed or 'not had the opportunity' to assert their loyalty since 1777 were 
now required to do so through the authority of a Justice of the Peace. The 
language of the oath reflects the intensity of the fear and resentment 
Pennsylvanians still felt for those who had been loyal to the crown; Oath 
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takers first had to "renounce and refuse all allegiance to King George the 
Third" before stating (on oath) they had never assisted the British cause 
87 
against American independence after the Declaration in 1776. The 
debates in the chamber over the wording of this section, illustrates the 
divided opinion about reconciliation with loyalists. Newspapers reported 
that the issue was of such importance to the people that, "vast numbers 
filled the gallery.. .and many were obliged to return home, disappointed of 
places."88 
Benjamin Rush addressed the assembly at length on the issue, 
counselling the legislature to repeal the act entirely in order to be a true, 
liberty-loving republic.89 His eloquence was to no avail however as fear 
and resentment won out over reconciliation; the proposal to erase the 
explicit renunciation of allegiance to the King was rejected and the 
reinforcement of the Test Act was supported two to one.90 Maryland also 
passed a similar reinforcement of the Test Act in the format of an oath of 
allegiance.91 Significantly, the act reinforced the notion of treason and 
declared that any individual convicted of treason, or who had "joined, 
aided, abetted.. .or in any way countenanced the Savages in their 
depredations against the United States," was not eligible to undertake the 
7
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oath of allegiance and gain citizenship. In theory, the new republic allowed 
only Tories whose role in the war had been minimal to redeem themselves 
by taking the oath and gaining citizenship. 
In addition to the debates at the legislative level, local studies 
reveal that a disparity existed between the legal qualifications for 
citizenship proscribed at the state and national level compared to the 
regulation of naturalization by individual towns and communities. In 
Connecticut for example, towns like Fairfield and Norwalk adopted strict 
regulations against allowing loyalists to return which was at odds with 
both the state policy of forgiveness and the stipulations of the Treaty of 
Paris.93 John Adam's, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay even wrote a public 
letter to the town criticizing their harsh treatment of remaining and 
returning loyalists. The letter was a direct response to the Committee 
established in New Haven a month earlier, which 'tried' each loyalist 
application for repatriation. The Committees actions echoed the days of 
loyalty oath and test acts.94 Further north in Massachusetts in 1784, 
former loyalists Samuel Stearns and Archibald McNeill were arrested and 
imprisoned for three years when they tried to return to their home state 
despite state legislation advocating reintegration.95 In addition, the more 
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informal regulation by communities, still worked to exclude or force out 
their undesirables through persistent discrimination. 
The transition from the Test Laws to the first Naturalization Act in 
1787 made such disparities less prevalent. Just as the Test Act 
standardized identification and punishment for treason the Naturalization 
Act re-made the Test Act to suit the needs of the new republic. The 
protracted Congressional debates over requirements for naturalization 
throughout the 1780s, helps explain the support in Maryland and 
Pennsylvania for continuance of the Test Act. As suggested at the outset of 
the chapter the principle of an oath of allegiance and requirements to 
explicitly renounce allegiance to the British King that developed during 
the Revolution found new life in the Naturalization Laws of 1787 and 
1790.98 The concerns raised in Congress during the debates that lasted 
over four years reflected the anxieties learned because of the civil war 
dimension of the Revolution. For example, the question of 'interstate-
citizenship' worried many representatives; would individuals be permitted 
to apply for citizenship in different states at the same time? Might 
individuals be allowed to apply to a different state for citizenship if denied 
it in others? The presence and actions of Loyalists in the war instigated 
these questions and made universal requirements for citizenship 
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necessary." For example, Richard Smith a proscribed loyalist in 
Massachusetts who failed the Test Act applied for and was awarded 
citizenship in Connecticut in January 1783.100 
In addition, these examples illustrate in microcosm the larger issue 
of state versus national supremacy; as James Madison mused in The 
Federalist interstate citizenship meant, "very improper power would still 
be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other state."101 
Issues such as property ownership, office holding and demands for a 'good 
moral character' weighed heavy in the deliberations and again reflected 
the unease caused by the internal enemies. Property was used against the 
loyalists as a method of punishment and dissuasion in the war, which 
explains its focus of power and status in the Naturalization debates; could 
'aliens' become citizens without owning property? Interestingly, Congress 
voted in the negative but still required a two-year residency before 
applying for citizenship as well as a formal oath of allegiance to "satisfy 
the court of their good character."102 In fact, as the Loyalists who stayed 
in America were in fact citizens rather than aliens before the law they did 
not have to go through the process of formal naturalization. However, the 
ambiguity of the stipulations, compounded by the length of time it took to 
become law meant those loyalists who chose to stay in the United States 
were susceptible to informal regulation of citizenship by their local 
Cases in which loyalists were denied citizenship in one state but accredited with it in another made 
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communities. In this transition period from colony to republic, Americans 
developed a cultural meaning of citizenship based on virtue and 
usefulness. 
Moreover, attention to the transition from the Test Acts to 
Naturalization illuminates what legal citizenship meant in the political 
culture of the early republic. American citizens disagreed about the value 
in reasserting the Test Act. Some regarded it as a valid and necessary 
regulation, whereas others advocated its immediate repeal in the interests 
of honoring republican principles. Regardless, communities acknowledged 
that denial of the right to vote or hold office was effectively the denial of 
citizenship. Indeed, as Rogers Smith has shown "citizenship was 
something more than mere inhabitancy," it required a sense of belonging 
to a "common sovereignty" and exercising ones membership through 
voting and office holding. Loyalists who remained in the United States 
then occupied the ambiguous ground of legal citizens without voting rights 
or office holding privileges. As a result, they found alternate ways to 
demonstrate their civic virtue. 
* * * 
Tench Coxe exemplifies the conundrum that former loyalists faced. 
On paper, Coxe exuded all the qualities of the ideal American citizen; he 
was a man blessed with business acumen, working his way from the 
counting house floor to Alexander Hamilton's Treasury department within 
103
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half a decade.104 He also found time to exercise a social conscience, sitting 
simultaneously on the boards of the Philadelphia Abolition Society and the 
"Philadelphia Society for alleviating the miseries of public prisons."105 
The eminent historian of American economic thought, Joseph Dorfman 
has gone so far to describe Coxe as the "Defoe of America."1 6 More 
recently, scholars have portrayed Coxe as the "Judas" of the "Financial 
Founding Fathers."107 
Regardless, there is more at work here than simply contested 
historiography. The experience of Tench Coxe and other loyalists who 
chose potential exile within the United States, rather than become refugees 
outside it, shed new light on the meaning of American citizenship in the 
new republic. Coxes' fellow Philadelphians welcomed his self-conscious 
effort to become (in his own words) a "good American" through hard 
work and innovation. However, their acceptance of his role in the 
economic sphere did not translate into the realm of politics. Contemporary 
responses to his foray into the political world illustrate the limit of his 
colleagues' toleration. Coxe could be a useful citizen in the economic 
In Machine in the Garden, Leo Marx credits Tench Coxe with one of the few who could foresee and 
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world but could not presume to proscribe for the nation in the political 
realm. ,08 
Coxe's Tory bent was well known; during the war, he spent time in 
Loyalist safe havens in New York and New Jersey only to return to his 
native Philadelphia with British troops in 1777 perceiving his return as a 
"vindication of his loyalty to the English."109 As the law dictated, the local 
Committee on Safety accused Coxe of treason for his actions. However, 
through family connections to the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania and 
personal friendships with notable citizens such as Benjamin Rush and 
Thomas Mckean Coxe managed to convince the legislature of his 
commitment to the American cause by taking the oath of allegiance. In 
doing so, he avoided property confiscation and banishment. Coxe's 
experience supports Hyman's conclusion that the oath was merely an 
official token of recognition rather than the definitive measure of 
reliability. However, Coxe held onto the oaths until his death, which 
suggests the oaths' legal and perhaps symbolic importance.110 It was not 
simply a verbal ceremony but a legal document binding Coxe's loyalty to 
the independent states. This, together with his admission to family friend 
and fellow loyalist William Tilghman that he was, "if permitted...likely to 
become a good American" indicates Coxe's willingness to adapt to the 
new regime.111 His actions suggest that his commitment although self 
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interested, was very real which foregrounds the question of motive and 
incentive. The idea of exile did not occur to Coxe because his business 
networks and family connections tied him to North America. Exile simply 
did not make good business sense. Moreover, his business connections and 
commercial skills were also the reasons his contemporaries wanted him to 
remain. 
Reading the classified section of a Philadelphia newspaper in the 
mid 1780s, the monopoly that Tench Coxe and his partner, Nalbro Frazier 
enjoyed on the luxury and unusual goods market is marked. From their 
storefront on Chestnut Street, Coxe and Frazier provided merchandise 
ranging from whale oil to furniture cottons, Dutch laces to Satin wood, 
Madeira Wine to selections of millenary items. Coxe's business helped 
fuel the new activity of shopping for luxury goods, which became a 
popular and legitimate pastime in the new republic. In fact, many 
historians classify this period as the "refining of American society", and 
Coxe contributed to this shift."113 In addition to the sale of such a variety 
of goods, Coxe and Frazier negotiated charter contracts for vessels, and 
acted as agents for house lets and ship sales.114 They were incredibly 
successful intermediaries in a depressed economy and in Jacob Cooke's 
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estimation Coxe was the "ideal business ally in America."115 It seems 
Coxe's economic usefulness allowed him to stay in America after 1783 
despite his chequered past. 
Coxe also played a pivotal role in the development of American 
manufacturing. While on the board of the "Pennsylvania Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts and Domestic Manufacturers," Coxe worked hard 
to establish similar societies in other states and directed attempts to steal 
English designs for textile machinery.116 Despite Coxe's positive role in 
the Philadelphian and American economy, there remained lingering 
distrust of his political ideology. In the fall of 1799 his Tory past came 
back to haunt him when his fellow townsmen voted against his nomination 
117 
to the House of Representatives. Coxe's public support for Thomas 
McKean's campaign for Governor of Philadelphia in 1799 compromised 
McKean's position, as Coxe's traitorous past was unearthed and used to 
undermine the cause.118 Yet, at the same time as Coxe received such 
slander in the newspapers he was also nominated chairman of a Committee 
that raised funds to improve the road system between Philadelphia's 
outlying counties to increase their population and prosperity.119 For Coxe, 
his Tory past was forgotten on the commercial floor but reared its very 
ugly head when he dared to cross the threshold into politics. 
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In many respects, Coxe is an extreme example, and as he took the 
oath of allegiance before the Treaty of Paris, he qualified for the full rights 
of citizenship, which meant he could own land and exercised his voting 
rights. The experience of Peter Van Schaak offers a very different, though 
no less illuminating perspective on the reasons certain loyalists were 
allowed to return and their function in the new republic. Born in New 
York, Van Schaack adopted a policy of neutrality during the Revolution 
and therefore refused to take the oath of allegiance to New York.120 In 
accordance with the law he was then exiled to Boston and ultimately 
banished to England under the Banishment Act of 1777.121 Despite his 
traitorous record and exile in England for three years of the war, Van 
Schaack was welcomed back to New York in August of 1785 with 
seemingly no objections from his fellow natives.122 Crucially, however 
Van Schaack and the three other loyalists whose citizenship was restored 
by the state of New York in a ceremony in May 1784 still had to take an 
oath of allegiance to the state.123 In addition, although New York 
reinstated Van Schaack to the bar he had to start from a much lower 
position than he had left, illustrating the need for him to earn or prove his 
worthiness of citizenship. As a lawyer, an intellectual and a family man 
New Yorkers forgave Van Schaack, but the principle of formal allegiance 
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remained.124 The American loyalists who stayed in the United States and 
those that returned from exile reminded Americans of treason's potential 
primacy as a function of change in the new republic. 
Attention to less conspicuous Tories also reinforces the observation 
that loyalists who stayed in North America did so the basis of their 
economic viability. In his study of loyalists in post-Independence 
Connecticut, Oscar Zeichner found that the patriots' motivation for 
allowing their internal enemies back into the community lay in the 
opportunities they provided for wealth and trade for the town. Rebecca 
Starr uncovered similar financial reasons for loyalist rehabilitation on 
Danfuskie Island.126 Significantly, Zeichner identified disparities between 
the state legislation on "disloyal citizens" and the way individual towns 
treated them. Fairfield, Connecticut for example prohibited its 'internal 
enemies' from voting or holding office for seven years, but embraced the 
contributions those same individuals made to improving Connecticut's 
trade links and economic standing.127 David E. Maas uncovered similar 
patterns in Massachusetts where Marblehead residents conveniently 
forgave Thomas Robie's Tory past, welcoming the return of his family in 
exchange for a competitive dry goods store.1281 argue that this trend was 
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in fact widespread, and that former Tories like Tench Coxe were 
welcomed back into the community based on their financial viability. In 
addition, I suggest that former loyalists exercised their "volitional 
allegiance," not through voting or office holding but through active 
innovation in the economy. 
Ex-loyalists played a pivotal role in generating debate about how the 
economy would work in the new republic. The concept of the bank in the 
early 1800s was problematic. In theory they were public enterprises, yet 
they were privately funded and exclusively directed.129 The move towards 
explicit private ownership of banks in 1780s created an environment in 
which ex-loyalist merchants Archibald McCall, Benjamin Chew, Edward 
Shippen and Samuel Pleasants challenged the monopoly of the Bank of 
North America. ' ° These men proposed a Bank of Pennsylvania to create 
a healthy competitive environment and thus a better service to 
Philadelphians. They argued a second bank would solve the problem of 
inflation caused by valueless paper money and negate the need to return to 
the land bank system. One supporter of the scheme likened the benefit 
of a second bank to a topic many of its readers could relate to; he asked 
plainly "whether a traveller was best served in a town that had two taverns 
129
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or one," a rhetorical question he did not insult the reader by answering.132 
Although the plan failed, it did force the Bank of America to amend its 
structure slightly and limit its corporate existence to 14 years and its 
capital to $2,000,000.133 While unsuccessful in their plan, these former 
loyalists helped shape the economic structure of post-revolution 
Pennsylvania, a positive influence that may explain why they were 
permitted to stay despite their Tory past. 
New Hampshire was equally perceptive in its choice of loyalists 
allowed to stay. The mob in Portsmouth hounded John Stavers outside his 
house in 1776 for his allegiance to the King. His monarchic affiliations 
were "conspicuous" because his tavern was named the Earl of Halifax, his 
brother Bartholomew voluntarily left for England during the war and he 
was suspected of breaking the non-importation and consumption 
agreement. As a result, the local mob enacted charivari on Stavers by 
pelting his house with rocks and severely injuring his black slave. 
However, Stavers was able to convince the town of his ability to adapt to 
the new republic and crucially his usefulness in the economy of 
Portsmouth. The visual change of his tavern from the Earl of Halifax to the 
William Pitt Tavern in favour of a pro-American member of Parliament 
went some way to satisfying the first requirement. In addition, he agreed to 
sign an oath of allegiance to New Hampshire and thus the local Committee 
decided he was innocent. Moreover, as Pitt Tavern continued to provide a 
132
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social hub and economic center for the town, housing visiting dignitaries 
such as George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, the Portsmouth 
community permitted Stavers to stay to help keep the Portsmouth 
134 
economy buoyant. 
New Hampshire residents of Ipswich allowed loyalist Reuben 
Kidder to remain after independence for similar reasons. According to 
Lorenzo Sabine, Kidder was the "richest man in that town" and 
contributed to the prosperity of the small town. Kidder's reintegration by 
fellow residents was even more surprising because Kidder refused to 
recognize the new government and did not take the oath of allegiance. 
Crucially, although he did not exercise his political rights as a citizen to 
vote or hold office, he did pay his taxes.135 Indeed his financial usefulness 
was evident in 1791 when the New Hampshire General Court declared that 
in contrast to the tax of 2 pence for acre for most Washington county 
citizens, Kidder's land would be taxed "the sum of 15 pounds for the 
purpose of repairing the public highways."136 Ipswich decided to overlook 
Kidder's political obstinacy in exchange for the economic public good. 
Given the uncertainty surrounding their status, the question of the 
motives of those loyalists who stayed or very quickly returned to America 
becomes a critical one. If they were neither fully enfranchised American 
citizens, nor British subjects with protection by the Empire why did 
loyalists wish to stay in North America amidst potential hostility and 
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persistent confusion over their legal and national identity? Alan Taylor's 
recent study of Upper Canada in this period further highlights the 
importance of this question.137 Taylor demonstrated that Britain carved out 
certain regions of Canada as an antidote to the perceived radical politics of 
the former North American colonies.138 The agreement was based on the 
availability of cheap land and agreement of low taxes in exchange for 
passive political subjects. If this was indeed the case, does this suggest that 
those 413,000 loyalists who chose to stay in the United States embraced 
the principle of popular participation? Moreover, if the tax burden was so 
much lighter in Upper Canada than in the post war United States, what 
were the incentives to stay in the independent republic? The selections of 
case studies above suggest that the economic opportunities in the new 
republic were more important than the political system or allegiance. 
Additionally, their practice of "volitional allegiance" belies the accepted 
belief that the Loyalists were invalid both in and after the Revolution. 
To explore this question further we look forward in the next 
chapter to the merchant culture of the Early Republic and the role former 
loyalists played in establishing American trade and commercial networks 
on a competitive international footing. 
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Chapter 2 
Things Left Unsaid and Undone: Loyalists and the Quest for a 
Commercial Treaty. 1783-1796 
During the inchoate early days of the newly independent United 
States, few issues plagued politicians, merchants, sailors and planters alike 
more than America's commercial policy. South Carolinian, St. George 
Tucker reflected the attitude of his generation best when he explained that 
commerce was the "barometer of power," the real test of America's 
political revolution. Economic historians John J. McCusker and Russell 
Menard, shared a similar interpretation when they characterized commerce 
as the "elixir" for any successful democracy.139 Whichever instrument they 
chose, in the two decades after independence American politicians were 
understandably keen to shift their focus from political negotiations to 
economic considerations and in particular to expand the nation's 
commercial interests.140 
The question of trading policy with the British West Indies was a 
crucial piece of the commercial puzzle. Analysis of this slice of policy 
and activity can shed light on the larger issues of the period: Did America 
qualify for British trade privileges after Independence? If not, how would 
they re-establish trade with overseas markets? In this sense, the many 
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facets of Anglo-American relations in the 1780s and 1790s involved not 
only a battle for commercial dominance, but also the struggle for a sense 
of national pride and identity. It replayed and reworked the ideological 
battleground of the American Revolution, allowing Britain and America to 
explore the dynamics of their new relationship. It was a dispute played in 
the legislative assemblies of the West Indies, the British Isles and the 
United States and by planters and merchants on the ground. 
I suggest that the experience and actions of the loyalists in the 
elusive search for a commercial agreement with Great Britain needs 
further attention. As refugees in the West Indies and as merchants in 
America the loyalists contributed to this effort by lobbying the British 
Parliament and subverting British imperial trade restrictions. In so doing, 
they played a significant role in trying to alleviate the prohibitions 
stipulated in the Treaty of Paris (1783) and in Jays Treaty (1796). By 
refocusing attention onto a select group of historical actors within a 
particular aspect of the larger picture of commercial relations, historians 
can gain a better understanding of the influence loyalists had on British 
policy after independence.141 They were not simply passive subjects nor 
disinterested refugees but proactive members of a changing commercial 
community. In addition, this chapter demonstrates how two Loyalist exiles 
living in London also helped shape British commercial policy. By 'adding' 
loyalists to the narrative in this way, this study helps to reveal the links 
141 Charles R. Ritcheson makes this argument in, "Loyalist Influence" on British Policy Towards the United 
States After the American Revolution," in Eighteenth Century Studies, Vol 7, (Autumn, 1973) 1-171 
discuss this argument in more depth below. 
between the Early Republic and those sections of the British Atlantic like 
the West Indies that remained in the colonial period. Tracing merchant 
loyalists from the Revolution into the national period provides anchors to 
illuminate these links and continuities. In addition, it illustrates Jack P. 
Greene's argument that the peripheries of an empire have as great an 
influence on the dynamics of that empire as its' center. 14 
Attention to the West Indies as a critical component to 
understanding the British Empire and the American Revolution has 
become rather de rigueur of late. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy's book, 
An Empire Divided has paved the way for acknowledging that Britain 
possessed 26 colonies in North America, rather than the traditional 
conception of 13.143 By placing the West Indies in a more central position 
in analysis of the Revolution, it becomes apparent that any study of the 
American political economy after independence must also include those 
islands. This study will use O'Shaughnessy's classification of the 'West 
Indies' or the British Caribbean encompassing Jamaica, Barbados, 
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, 
Tortola and Tobago.' The largest concentrations of loyalist refugees 
were in Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica and St. Kitts and that is where the 
merchants predominantly directed their trade.145 
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At the Treaty of Paris (1783) the American delegates foregrounded 
the question of American trade with the West Indies. John Adams best 
represented the American position when he argued that the "commerce of 
the West Indian Islands is part of our American system of commerce. They 
can neither do without us nor we without them."146 In fact, Charles W. 
Toth ably demonstrates that the American representatives believed the 
United States had a natural right to trade with the West Indies. Writing 
almost forty years after the deliberations Henry Bliss remarked that, "the 
Americans seem always to have considered the West Indian trade as theirs 
of right.. .which they apparently interpret as the law of nature and of 
nations."147 The negotiations for the Treaty of Amity, Navigation and 
Commerce (Jays Treaty) thirteen years later raised similar issues. In 1783, 
the American delegates broached the subject of West Indian trade as early 
as day two of the negotiations. In 1796, the opening of the West Indian 
ports to American vessels was one of only two 'non-negotiable' clauses 
for the American delegation. Direct comparison between the two treaties 
makes the American quest for international trade privileges throughout the 
1780s and the early 1790s manifest. Because the same issues persisted 
over the thirteen-year period it is evident the Americans were ultimately 
disappointed. 
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This chapter will focus on the vocal objections to these restrictions 
from the West Indies and the North American mainland. It will trace the 
American pursuit of better privileges from the Treaty of Paris (1783) to 
Jays Treaty (1796) and conclude that although they were unsuccessful in 
each regard the efforts to secure more trading rights supports 
characterization of the period as a replay of the Revolution. In the light of 
this, it is important to stress that most scholars agree that the British 
embargo on American shipping did not cause a significant downturn in 
either the American or the West Indian economy. Andrew Jackson 
O'Shaughnessy suggests the annual average profit of 8.5 % was in keeping 
148 
with the 10% average for the century. Michael Craton goes further to 
propose 1786 and 1787 were the most prosperous years in the eighteenth 
century for the British Caribbean.149 In the history of the British-American 
economy, John J. McCusker and Russell Menard confirm that the 
economic impact of the American Revolution on America was "not half so 
radical as the political changes" and characterize the period for both 
America and the West Indies as one of 'economic pause' rather than a 
significant downturn.150 If the real economic effects of the restrictions 
were not quite as drastic as contemporary responses suggest, attention to 
the ideological impact of the prohibitions becomes increasingly important 
and suggests the subversions of the regulations by West Indian and 
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149
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American merchants alike was prompted as much by national pride as 
national survival. 
*** 
In order to appreciate fully the importance of the West Indies in the 
economic and ideological replay of the American Revolution it is 
imperative to recognize the significance of the Navigation Acts of 1651-
1673. In this period, the Acts worked as the lynchpin of Britain's 
commercial Empire, privileging British goods and British ships over 
foreign trade.151 They served the dual purpose of achieving commercial 
monopoly while fostering a sense of belonging and community to the 
empire. As John Morgan suggested in 1766, the Acts created such wealth 
for the Empire that they encouraged a "spirit of industry among her 
inhabitants."152 McCusker and Menard illustrated the Acts achieved this 
sense of community because they benefited, "Philadelphia merchants as 
well as the merchants of Plymouth, sailors from New York as well as 
sailors from Old York."153 The real strength of the Acts however, lay in 
their emphasis on the carrying trade. It was not simply privileging British 
goods over foreign ones that was valuable, but favoring British ships over 
151
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foreign vessels. This, according to Benjamin Franklin meant Britain 
owned the seas and could therefore, "maintain... the safety of navigation in 
it, [and] keep it clear of pirates," which as a result allowed Britain to 
enforce some, "toll or duty on merchandizes carried through that part of 
[her] dominion."154 Ownership of the sea secured greater international 
power and generated more income from the duties collected from the 
goods carried. As a result, McCusker and Menard argue, "the inflow of 
gold and silver increased."155 Indeed, the American pursuit of trade rights 
to the West Indies was due in large part to the profitability established in 
that trade before the Revolution. 
The economic benefits of mercantilism explain the American 
delegates' commitment to a commercial trade clause at the treaty 
negotiations in Paris. Before the Revolution the West Indies absorbed the 
export trade from North America's four key ports: Boston, Philadelphia, 
New York and Newport. The trade was extremely lucrative because each 
shipment carried a variety of goods. For example, a cargo could carry 
oysters and bricks, horses and stones all in one consignment. In addition, 
business was fraternal and solidly established, as firms in each location 
would often work in partnership by sharing vessels and business.156 These 
relationships exemplified the empire's mercantilist policy. The British 
prohibition of American trade with the West Indies during the Revolution 
Quoted in Gould, The Persistence of Empire, 124. 
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was therefore a method of punishment for rebellion and an act of coercion 
to return to imperial control. The refusal of the Fox and North 
administration in Britain to back down at the Treaty of Paris meant that the 
British continued to treat American ships as foreign vessels in the West 
Indian trade.157 From the British perspective, extending trading privileges 
to America was out of the question. It flouted the concept of mercantilism 
and therefore undermined Britain's naval and commercial ascendancy. As 
a result, the Treaty of Paris only stipulated American's right to fish in 
Newfoundland and the Gulf of St Lawrence. It did not mention any trading 
privileges with any part of the British Empire.158 In practice, this meant 
American ships were prohibited from trading with the West Indies and 
could only exchange goods with the islands via British owned vessels. 
Wallace Brown's thorough study of the American loyalists sheds 
light on their potential importance in the colonial trade between North 
America and the West Indies. Brown asserts that most loyalists had a 
"commercial tendency."159 In fact, he concludes, "Everywhere the 
commercial element - merchants, shopkeepers, artisans.. .contributed a 
greater percentage to the ranks of loyalists."160 More specifically, in 
Virginia, 64% of Loyalists were merchants by trade. This majority 
becomes even clearer in the reports of the Virginia Merchants Association. 
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In 1763, the Association had 72 members of which only 4 ultimately 
supported the rebellion against Britain.161 Figures from the New York 
Chamber of Commerce reinforce Brown's idea of a "commercial 
tendency." The New York Chamber of Commerce 104-member body 
included 57 loyalists. Isaac Low, for example, a prominent loyalist, was 
President of the board in 1782 before he failed the Test Act and was 
proscribed and banished to England.162 David E. Maas' book The Return 
of the Massachusetts Loyalists also finds merchants as the dominant 
occupation within the loyalist classification. While the majority (71%) left 
after the evacuation of Boston, 24 % remained behind.163 Indeed, Arthur 
M. Schlesinger's study, The Colonial Merchants and the American 
Revolution, argues that British trade restrictions implemented after 1763 
did not adversely affect the merchant community, which meant few 
merchants actively supported independence. This did not mean all 
merchants were overwhelmingly loyal to the crown, but it does mean that 
they were, "dragged along [to independence] unwillingly by the planter 
aristocracy."164 
Robert A. East's study of business relations through the 
revolutionary period also suggests, "most merchants were loyalists, but 
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most were not exiled, and the majority even escaped confiscation." The 
experience of Isaac and Carpenter Wharton, merchants in Philadelphia 
help illuminate East's observation. They were first attainted with treason 
for illicit trade with the British but the charges were ultimately dropped 
and they were released.166 Wallace Brown also cites several of 
Pennsylvania's leading merchant families as examples of East's assertion. 
According to Brown, the Morrises, Willings,' Pembertons' and Whartons' 
all remained in the United States.167 Lorenzo Sabine reinforces the 
Pemberton's experiences insofar as a James Pemberton of Philadelphia 
was "universally respected" and died in Philadelphia in 1809. 
Unfortunately, Sabine does not explicitly describe him as a merchant and 
none of the other family names are listed. In fact, although the secondary 
literature suggests many loyalist merchants continued to work and trade in 
the early national period there are no significant leads in the primary 
material.169 The secondary material does suggest that because the majority 
of loyalists were merchants those that stayed in America had a vested 
interest in securing the best possible trade privileges. 
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1691 searched for names identified in East and Brown's work in Arthur Schlesinger's The Colonial 
Merchant and the American Revolution, Stuart Bruchey's The Colonial Merchant, (New York, Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc, 1966), both volumes of Sabine's Biographical Sketches but to no avail. Brown cites 
East and no one else for this particular point and East's book is currently on order. I intend to readdress this 
investigation for the doctoral dissertation which will allow me to visit the necessary archives in London and 
Philadelphia to (hopefully) elicit some firmer answers. My sense is that the Tench Coxe papers at the 
Library Company of Philadelphia will prove fruitful in this regard. 
Interestingly, two very different types of loyalists, probably 
classified as "real British subjects" according to the criteria in chapter one, 
worked against extending those much sought after concessions. 
Traditionally Britain's decision to pursue the principle of mercantilistism 
after 1783 is attributed to Lord Sheffield. Sheffield's Observations on the 
Commerce of the American States was published in 1784 and advocated 
enforcement of the navigation acts to weaken the newly independent 
states.170 More recently, John Crowley places William Knox in a more 
influential role.171 A loyalist from Georgia, Knox was one of the few 
refugees to receive a government post in England.172 Born in Ireland, he 
worked as an official in Georgia for five years and remained a landholder 
throughout the revolutionary period.173 His failure of the Test Act 
determined his status as a Loyalist as well as his presence in Lorenzo 
Sabine's Biographical Sketches.11 Knox earned his influential role under 
Lord North in the American Department of the Colonial Secretary's 
cabinet. The Department was responsible for strengthening London's 
control of colonial policy which, before the Revolution they did through 
such measures as the Sugar Act 1764, Currency Act 1764 and the 
infamous Stamp Act in 1765.175 In an open letter dated 1765 Knox 
articulated the Department's justification for the Stamp Act by 
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highlighting Parliamentary sovereignty in all matters. First, he noted the 
absence in colonial charters for explicit exemption from taxation. 
Secondly, he contended that Parliament's right to tax was the same as its 
right to confiscate property (which was accepted as legitimate), and he 
argued finally that economic regulations by Parliament were the reason for 
the colonies' prosperity and therefore ought to continue. Given Knox's 
emphasis on Parliament's sovereignty, it is unsurprising that he continued 
to assert Britain's dominance through commercial legislation after the 
peace treaty of 1783. To achieve this, Knox recommended that American 
vessels be prohibited from direct trade with the British West Indies, and as 
a result, American goods to the Islands had to be transported in British 
vessels.177 
In some respects, Britain's persistence with mercantilist principles 
was a reflection of the value of West Indian trade. Indeed, the importance 
of the West Indies for the prosperity of the British Empire and the success 
of the carrying trade in particular, was evident long before the American 
Revolution. Because of their climate, the fertility of the soil, and the 
wealth of slave labor, the West Indies provided the Empire with sugar, one 
of its most lucrative commodities. Herbert Bell asserts that Britain had 
sixty million pounds invested in the Islands and three quarters of its 
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revenue derived from those sugar rich colonies. Indeed, the British 
ministry believed, "His Majesty's Dominions in the West Indies" were 
"the principle source of the national opulence."179 In return, the metropole 
treated the West Indies with a degree of bias, offering exemptions from 
several imperial taxes.180 Naturally, any post-war commercial policy 
needed to favor Britain in the carrying of trade to and from the West Indies 
in order to ensure that Britain would continue to benefit from the islands' 
profitability. 
Enforcement of the Navigation Acts after the Treaty of Paris was 
l o t 
also a way of exerting ideological control over the independent states. 
Because the Acts emphasized the carrying trade over the commercial, it 
was not American goods that were discriminated against but American 
vessels. The only restricted American products were beef, pork and fish. 
The real intention of the policy to monopolize the carrying trade ensured 
British ships continued to dominate the sea. This enabled a replay of the 
struggle for ascendancy acted out in the Revolution to take place in the 
commercial arena throughout the 1780s and 1790s. 
British ministers praised William Knox for the policy he created. 
The response in Britain to the policy was characterized by Edward Gibbon 
who praised its author as the 'defender if not the savior of the navigation 
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acts." George Chalmers hoped the retention of the Navigation Acts 
would succeed in 'inconveniencing,' the independent states and Edward 
Ball believed it was a just punishment to treat the rebels as disobedient 
children.183 As British Consul in America for the Middle States, Phineas 
Bond echoed the British response in America. He emphasized the 
importance of British commercial control, making it synonymous with 
imperial power and believed a reduction in the former as a sign of 
weakness of the Empire.184 The integration of the carrying trade with 
notions of national and ideological power exacerbated the commercial 
conflict between Britain and the newly independent United States. 
This is not to suggest that the policy arrived at was reached 
smoothly. American trade rights divided parties on both sides of the 
Atlantic and laid bare the ideological differences caused by the 
Revolution. There were several factions within the British ministry, some 
of whom advocated no restrictions on American trade, and often more 
conservative sections, which Knox's proposals represented. Lord 
Shelburne suggested treating American vessels like British ones, but 
Charles Fox and many others rejected such a proposal as nonsense; in 
order to recognize American independence Britain must treat her like a 
foreign nation.185 They did all agree, however, on the crucial distinction 
between the commercial and the carrying trade. The key point of 
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contention between British ministers was not in allowing the trade of 
American goods, but what vessels were used. By monopolizing the 
carrying trade in this way, Britain maintained its naval strength and also 
limited defection of sailors to the US navy. The persistence of this policy 
justifies classification of the 1780s as an ideological battleground of 
lingering revolutionary disputes. 
In America, the question of West Indian trade exacerbated the 
divisions between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. Just as 
the issue of the legal identity of loyalists aggravated political disputes in 
the new republic, so too the West Indian trade caused a rift between the 
political parties.187 In general, Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton 
advocated a conciliatory approach to commercial affairs. Hamilton and 
his supporters did not want to alienate or aggravate Britain as they feared 
America was too dependant on her trade links. Instead, they sought to 
enact "favourable terms of trade with Britain [in order to] cultivate the 
trade of Anglo-American agents."189 
In contrast, soon to be Democratic-Republicans Madison and 
Jefferson advocated a more aggressive policy in which the U.S. coerced 
foreign nations into commercial treaties. Jefferson shared Madison's fiscal 
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approach and emphasized the importance of navigation. In fact, Jefferson 
demonstrated acute understanding of the purpose of the Navigation Acts as 
he "measured the success of American policy by the extent that American 
shipping displaced British."190 Jefferson knew America's commercial 
policy must emphasize using American ships for the carrying trade rather 
than promoting American produce in order to compete with Britain. 
Another Loyalist in London, George Chalmers ensured that 
commercial terms between Britain and America would not be equal.191 
The Committee on Trade, established in March 1784 worked hard to put 
Knox's recommendations into practice and Chalmers in particular 
reinforced the basic principles on which the regulations were founded. 
George Chalmers was born in Scotland but immigrated to Maryland after 
graduating from Kings College in Aberdeen. During the revolution, his 
allegiance to the Crown forced his return to Britain where along with 
Knox, he was one of the more fortunate loyalists to receive a government 
post in London.192 He has left behind a rich array of writings that reveal 
how seriously he took his work and how reflective he was on matters of 
political concern. In his lengthy 'Opinion' on the impact of American 
independence on Britain's commercial policy, Chalmers exemplifies the 
connection between commercial policy and national identity. In this two-
hundred-page thought piece, Chalmers justified Britain's restriction on 
America's commercial privileges by utilizing the legal construct of 
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American citizenship. He argued that because Americans were no longer 
British subjects and were foreign in fact, especially, "in some important 
points of our naval policy, the American Citizens are declared to be 
aliens," and thus denied commercial privileges.193 The weight placed on 
this argument is evident from its position at the commencement of the 
piece and the sheer length of the discussion. Moreover, Chalmers' 
classification of Americans as "aliens" to Britain reinforces the intensity 
and persistence of the debate over legal identities in the fall out of the war. 
Interestingly, Chalmers believed that British subjects who retained 
commercial privileges and American citizens who were classified as aliens 
divided America.194 If this was indeed the case, loyalist merchants would 
have been a very useful asset to the newly independent United States, 
since they would qualify for the trade privileges to the British colonies. 
However, it does not seem possible, given the insistence on loyalty oaths 
and the practice of "volitional allegiance," that the new republic would 
allow loyalists to operate as British subjects in the new republic. 
Regardless, Chalmers' piece highlights the ideological dimensions to the 
dispute. This was not simply about economic ascendancy but national 
identity and imperial ascendancy. For instance, the Committee sought to 
maintain the mercantilist policy of Britain's Empire by substituting 
foodstuffs usually supplied to the West Indies from the United States with 
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goods from Canada and Nova Scotia. They sought to practice traditional 
mercantilist policy by substituting Canada for North America even though 
Canada simply did not have the internal resources nor established 
industries to supply the West Indies.195 
The examples of Knox and Chalmers suggest a significant, if 
modest, role was played in shaping British policy by those classified as 
loyalists. 1% This challenges Charles Ritcheson's assertion that the 
loyalists were neither numerous nor coherently organized enough to 
influence British policy towards America after independence. Ritcheson 
based his interpretation on the fact Knox and Chalmers were not 'loyal' 
enough to be classified as loyalist. Ritcheson asserted that Knox's status as 
an absentee landlord and Chalmers' stay in the US was too short and 
temporary to classify them as "loyalists."197 In practice, such narrow 
definitions are not particularly helpful or necessary. Both Knox and 
Chalmers were legally banished from the United States for their loyalty 
and are listed in Lorenzo Sabine's Biographical Sketches.198 If they were 
perceived as loyalists by contemporaries this seems evidence enough of 
their 'legitimate' loyalist identity. Indeed, their actions after independence 
attest to their commitment to one of the many principles of loyalism; 
working within and for the Empire to improve it for all members. In this 
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sense they were perhaps "real British subjects" whereas the loyalists in 
chapter one were "disloyal citizens." These comparisons elucidate the 
standard notion that loyalism was not a unified nor coherent movement in 
North America.199 Mary Beth Norton's magnum opus, The British-
Americans also challenges Ritcheson's analysis. She maintains that the 
Associated Loyalists in London were proactive and a viable lobbying 
force. She especially notes their significant achievement by establishing 
the American Claims Commission and bringing about the downfall of the 
Shelburne administration.200 
Knox and Chalmers' represent the experience of "real British 
subjects" whose support of the Crown was so conspicuous they were 
forced to leave America. As the above discussion illustrates this did not 
inhibit their continued relationship with America and perhaps even best 
equipped them for shaping British imperial policy. However, as chapter 
one demonstrated, the classification of the term 'loyalist' was contested 
both during and after the Revolution. The debate over "real British 
subjects" versus "disloyal citizens" also applied to those loyalists who 
were merchants before and throughout the Revolution. 
The one individual who can clarify the transition between loyalist 
merchants before and after the Revolution is Tench Coxe. Born into a 
family of merchants in Philadelphia his father, William Coxe was a 
prominent businessman who cultivated personal and professional 
The nature of loyalism is discussed in the introduction. All the key monographs on the Loyalists agree 
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relationships with other successful merchant families in the city. Most 
notable were the Tilghman's, the Allen's and Chew families who were 
prominent merchants in the city who also favored the Crown over 
Independence.201 In 1775, Tench Coxe joined his father's firm, Coxe and 
Furman as a junior partner despite the economic impact of the British 
restrictions. In December of 1776, Coxe was forced to leave the city due to 
"violence and threats of a body of armed men."202 He resumed business in 
New York though through his father's connections and even established 
networks of his own with leading merchants in New York such as Isaac 
Low and Edward Goold. On his return to Philadelphia with the British 
troops in September 1777 Coxe quickly resumed trading and set up his 
own firm, Coxe and Frazier.203 
Coxe bears out Wallace Brown's findings that most merchant 
loyalists who chose to stay in the United States after independence based 
themselves in Pennsylvania.204 This is significant in terms of the American 
- West Indian trade as Philadelphia was the key port of connection and 
departure. Indeed, Alice B. Keith's study of British restrictions on 
American-West Indian trade confirms that the majority of trade to and 
from the West Indies from 1784-1800 came from the Middle Atlantic 
States. 205 In 1794, the merchants of Philadelphia organized a formal 
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Committee to represent their interests to the Secretary of State. The 
Committee responded to British seizure of American ships in the West 
Indies, which compromised their trade links with both the French and 
British Islands.207 Committee members compiled the evidence from all 
cases of seizure of American ships in "the British Islands, the West Indies 
and [especially] Bermuda, [and] the Bahamas." John Jay then used this 
information as advantage to force a favorable commercial treaty with 
Great Britain in 1796. Although Jay was largely unsuccessful, Brown and 
Keith's findings illuminate the force of the merchant class in Philadelphia 
and touch on the importance of the West Indian trade for American 
merchants. 
Most surprisingly, a loyalist named Joseph Shoemaker was one of 
the five members of this small select committee, which contributed to the 
American policy at the treaty in 1796. Shoemaker was a native of 
Pennsylvania who aligned himself with the rebels until the Declaration of 
Independence. After switching allegiance, he accepted the command of a 
privateer ship and "commenced depredations on his former political 
friends."208 Governed by law of treason defined during the Revolution, 
Shoemaker was arrested for treason but because he surrendered he was 
released without charge. The fact that such a "conspicuous" Tory was 
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allowed to sit on an important committee in 1794 illustrates the extent of 
reintegration by that time and also strengthens the assertion that 
individuals who were permitted to stay brought with them economic 
viability. 
* * * 
Loyalists also contributed to shaping Britain and America's 
commercial relationship from the vantage point of exile in the West Indies. 
Estimates suggest that around 5,500 loyalists fled to the Islands between 
1782-1785, most of whom came from the Carolinas and Georgia. Largely 
attracted by the promise of free land, a fertile climate and military 
protection the refugees flocked to the commercial centers of Jamaica and 
the Bahamas. Indeed, in Nassau alone loyalist refugees increased the 
merchant population from 3 to 26 and doubled the total white population 
in the Bahamas.210 Printed first hand accounts and newspaper reports of 
the demographics and trade movements disseminated knowledge of the 
Islands' fertility. Oswell Eve, a Captain and, in historian Catherine Crary's 
estimation, a "shipping merchant of importance," wrote at length in 1784 
to his loyalist friend Daniel Coxe of New Jersey on the suitability of Cat 
Island as a loyalist haven. Eve sought to undue the traditional perception 
of the island in the Bahamas as only a fit "Asylum for Pirates and 
Wreckers and those fond of a marine way of living." He acknowledged the 
appearance of the landscape was not appealing but emphasized the 
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potential for growing cotton when cultivated properly. He also cited the 
wealth of a retired Pennsylvanian gentleman for proof of the islands' 
prospects and envisaged the perfect spot for a town and Government 
"some future day."2" In writing to Daniel Coxe who was working for his 
brother's merchant trading firm in Philadelphia, Eve's advertisement was 
probably passed on through informal networks of kin and trade. Indeed, 
the influx of New York loyalists to Great Abaco Island and Cat Island may 
be attributed in part to Eve's reports.212 
The South Carolinian press also promoted relocation to the West 
Indies as an attractive option to proscribed loyalists. Newspapers 
published bulletins from Nassau announcing the arrival of provisions 
specifically for the American loyalists.213 A second ship of provisions 
under Captain Fandall carrying provisions explicitly for American 
loyalists was reported much further north in the Connecticut Journal.214 
Such bulletins were factual rather than emotional but still added to the 
image of the West Indies as a safe asylum. In Jamaica, the prospects for 
loyalist exiles were good as they were exempt from taxation, were under 
no obligation to perform public service duties (aside from militia service) 
and were granted tracts of land free of charge.215 Many of the loyalist 
refugees were plantation owners or farmers and chose the West Indies as a 
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suitable venue to continue their business. Loyalists owned the Panton, 
Leslie and Company, which was one of the most successful trading firms 
in the West Indies with business networks in Britain and America. 
Despite the appearance of a loyalist idyll, the reality of exile in the 
West Indies was unsatisfactory for many. British ministers could not 
guarantee the land was fertile, nor could many crops survive the brutal 
hurricanes that swept the Islands in 1784.218 For instance, the chosen area 
of location in Jamaica was reported as "nothing more than a large 
morass.. .swarming with scorpions, serpents, lizards...nothing but the most 
ridiculous infatuation could tempt any men to expose their own lives to 
9 1Q 
such an unpromising situation." In addition, although historians argue 
the loyalists "infused the inert colony with fresh blood and energy," the 
native Creole population were not quite as effusive about the new 
990 
immigrants. Disagreements centred on issues of representation, with the 
native population perceiving loyalist involvement in government as a 
desire to "take over" and the refugees feeling original inhabitants' rights 
were prioritized at their expense. Governor Maxwell characterized the 
"merchants and people who hope to return to the continent" as the most 
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troublesome, partly for their demands but mostly because they stayed in 
commercial centers rather than accept tracts of land in the outer islands. 
The Board of American Loyalists based in Nassau in the Bahamas 
was organized in response to these disagreements. Led predominantly by 
James Hepburn of North Carolina and John Wells of South Carolina, the 
exiles complained about the administration, highlighting improper 
representation, the lack of regulation of the law, and corruption of public 
money. They denounced Governor Maxwell's address to the assembly 
as, "illiberal, untrue and malicious," designed to undermine and demonize 
the loyalist refugees.224 James Hepburn, President of the Board of 
American Loyalists articulated their mission "to preserve and maintain 
these Rights and Liberties for which we have left our homes and 
possessions."225 They achieved this through endless petitions to the 
Assembly, refusal to attend Assembly meetings until issues were resolved 
and declaring ultimatums; on May 9th 1785, the Board of Loyalists 
resolved that as they were not fairly represented in the House of Assembly, 
"we are of course not bound by any laws the Assembly might pass."226 In 
consequence, the Assembly suspended six of the loyalists for their directly 
involvement in the petition and prohibited from holding office in the 
future. However, despite these setbacks the loyalists were essentially 
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successful in achieving their aims. By 1786, American loyalists dominated 
the Bahamanian House of Assembly.227 The struggles and achievements of 
the loyalists in the West Indies exemplify the notion of the powerful 
periphery in an empire. Additionally, the "problem" of loyalists' dual 
allegiance is apparent in the West Indian exiles self-classification as 
"American Loyalists." 
Surprisingly, given the ideological divisions between loyalists and 
patriot Americans, the West Indian refugees' most important achievement 
lay in subverting British trade regulations and as a result securing better 
trade laws between the West Indies and America in the Jay Treaty 
(1796).228 As the dominant political power and a significant proportion of 
the Islands merchant and planter population, loyalists played a significant 
role in pressuring the British Parliament to retract its restrictions on 
American trade. The very first day the Committee on Trade met in 
London, it received numerous petitions from West Indian merchants and 
planters.229 This group designed the petitions to generate sympathy, 
highlighting fear of starvation if Britain refused American vessels 
permission to trade in West Indian ports. In fact, the refugees put words 
into action during times of specific need. Under the jurisdiction of Loyalist 
Governors like James Powell, the West Indian ports were illegally opened 
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to American vessels. For example, during the violent hurricanes of July 
1784, August 1785 and October 1786 Jamaican ports, which had been the 
worst affected, were open to free trade in order to assuage the devastation 
done to crops and foodstuffs.231 The discretionary power afforded to the 
Governors of the Islands' by the metropole became, according to Alice 
Keith the norm rather than the exception.232 
In addition, Bryan Edwards, a sugar planter in the British West 
Indies, feared the restrictions would cause "500,000 persons to be starved 
and a property of 60 million rendered unprofitable and precarious." He 
also complained that the broader commercial ramifications that restricting 
trade with America would only serve to benefit the commercial success of 
the French West Indian islands.233 Another West Indian planter Simon 
Taylor accused the British government of "entering into a combination to 
Ruin these islands" and likened the plight of the planters to that of the 
Gibionites from the bible.234 The vocal actions of Edwards, Taylor, the 
Board of American Loyalists and the Loyalist Governors exemplify Jack 
Greene's assertion that the peripheries of an empire have as much 
influence on the cultural and commercial dynamics on the empire as its 
center.235 
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Consequently, the efforts of the exiles in the West Indies worked in 
tandem with those of the merchants on mainland North America. Although 
the American states did not operate as a national unit, the action of 
individual states and merchants against the West Indian restrictions 
indicates the importance of the issue and demonstrates the relationship 
between commerce and national identity. Virginia set the precedent by 
lobbying the British parliament and generating a sense of unity of purpose 
in America. Virginians drafted a proposal to all thirteen states to give 
Congress the authority to enact nationwide prohibitions on the importation 
of British West Indian goods in British ships. Virginians argued that the 
British restrictions were in conflict with the principles of free commerce 
and they should resist by adopting similar prohibitory measures. 
The Virginia Act insisted on unity of action across all states, 
demanding, "this act shall not be in force until all the states in the union 
shall have passed similar laws." The clarity of the language and meaning 
in the Act suggests Americans regarded the issue as one of national pride. 
St. George Tucker, a lively Virginian who supported his state's proposal, 
made this connection with national honor even clearer. In a short pamphlet 
reflecting on the matter, Tucker inserted extracts from parliamentary 
speeches to incense the reader and encourage support for the proposal. He 
portrays Britain as a power hungry bully, eager to strangle American trade 
by cleverly inserting quotes from British ministers such as, "we will 
36
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regulate her [America's] markets as we please and give an effectual check 
to any attempt on the part of America to advance in ship building or 
navigation."237 Tucker's choice of quote is especially pertinent as it 
foregrounds the real locus of power; the carrying not the commercial trade. 
Massachusetts adopted a similar emotive and proactive response. 
Reminiscent of the revolutionary era Boston merchants boycotted British 
ships in April 1784. The British regulations forbade American goods to be 
exported in British ships and tonnage duties were imposed on all foreign 
shipping.238 In so doing, the Boston merchants sought to appropriate 
Britain's navigation strategy for their own ends, which reinforces the 
vision of the 1780s as a battleground for the revolution's replay. 
Newspaper reports reflected the anger and the sense of national offence 
Bostonians felt at the British restrictions. In the Continental Journal an 
address 'To the People of America' called for a unified response and asked 
readers to identify the British restrictions as an insult to "National Honor 
[which must] unite with our Interest to prevent injury to the one or insult 
to the other." Another Boston newspaper used an Aesop fable in which 
a father taught his sons the importance of working together to convince 
them of the necessity of a unified response.240 
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This mass hysteria becomes puzzling and more enlightening when 
we remember that the economic impact of the embargo was not actually 
detrimental to America or the West Indies.241 Selwyn H. Carrington's 
recent study of the trade between America and the West Indies, 1783-1807 
explains this apparent anomaly. Carrington suggests that the merchants 
from the West Indies and America who subverted the regulations were the 
main reasons the economic impact of the Revolution was not too severe. 
In fact, it was quite common for West Indian merchants to provide 
U.S. vessels with British documentation to undercut British restrictions. 
Phineas Bond's correspondence with the foreign office in London also 
confirms such illegal activity, which he described as so common that, "the 
mischief [is becoming] more alarming as the fraud is become general." In 
a letter dated December, 1787, Bond wrote with excitement that he had 
proof that American vessels were using illegal documentation (British 
papers) to trade illegally with the West Indies and Asia.244 Indeed, in 1785 
Horatio Nelson wrote Lord Sydney that despite British restrictions, "nearly 
the whole Trade between the British Colonies and the United States of 
America was carried out in American bottoms."245 In September of the 
same year, Bermuda was described to be in a state of "anarchy" as their 
merchants had furnished American vessels with false papers in order to 
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flout British prohibitions.246 James Edward Powell, Governor of the 
Bahamas was indignant that American products were smuggled into his 
jurisdiction.247 In 1789, two American vessels, the Patty from North 
Carolina and the Dunmore from South Carolina were seized by Custom 
948 
Officials in the Bahamas for breaching the laws of trade. In September 
1785 another American ship was seized in St Eustatius charged with trade 
in a "foreign bottom."249 The press reported the seizures in such a way as 
to suggest that the illegal trade was widespread. Reports complained about 
the volume of customs officials and the vigor with which they seized 
American vessels in or even near British waters. 
The actions of Tench Coxe, also a merchant of Philadelphia helps 
peel back the layers of how merchants dealt with the British trade 
restrictions and sheds light on the loyalist merchant networks in North 
America. Frazier, Coxe and Company was a big concern, with five full 
time clerks in addition to Coxe and his business partner, Nalbro Frazier. 
They had a large warehouse for storage in addition to a spot on the wharf 
where cargo was unloaded and often sold directly.251 The five clerks 
employed were either friends or family members, a very traditional setup 
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for merchant businesses in the eighteenth century.252 Daniel Coxe, Tench's 
loyalist brother who had helped form the West Jersey Volunteers during 
the Revolution was on the books.253 Archibald McCall, who was not a 
proscribed loyalist, worked intimately with Coxe throughout the 
Revolution and into the national period, especially on the proposals for a 
Second Bank of America. According to Coxe, McCall was "bred" with the 
Coxe family and business, which suggests McCall identified socially, if 
not legally as a Loyalist. Key to Coxe's success in the West Indian market 
was stable business relationships in the West Indies and London. In St 
Croix, Coxe re-established business links with Benjamin Yard and 
Nicholas Cruger who chose to overlook Coxe's compromised political past 
in favour of a profitable trade.255 In terms of the trade itself, Coxe's 
biographer Jacob Cooke asserts that the bulk of it was with the British 
Caribbean islands most of which took place legally in British vessels. 
However, Coxe and his partner Nalbro Frazier did own six of their own 
ships, three of which they constantly used as trading vessels to the islands 
throughout the 1780s. Coxe and Nalbro Frazier solicited 'buyers' for 
these ships in London and the Islands. No money changed hands in these 
transactions and the ships remained in Philadelphia but were registered 
252
 Peter Dobkin Hall argues that it wasn't until the mid 1800s that private institutions began to take over 
the family business as the foundation of America's commercial economy, The Organization of American 
Culture, 1700-1900: Private Institutions and the Origins of American Nationality, (New York, New York 
University Press, 1982) 32-33. 
253
 For Daniel Coxe as New Jersey Volunteer see Brown, Good Americans, 233. 
254
 This was also characteristic of pre-war trade between America and the West Indies. See Richard Pares, 
Yankees and Creoles; the trade between North America and the West Indies before the American 
Revolution, (Archon Books, 1968) 8, 16. 
255
 Cooke, Tench Coxe, 45. 
256
 Cooke, Tench Coxe 65. 
79 
either to a Moses Franks of London or Bell and La Touche of Jamaica. 
This enabled the vessel to carry British registration papers and thus, in 
theory trade legally between the United States and the West Indies. 
Another tactic merchants used to undermine British restrictions on 
American vessels was handling the exchange of trade too quickly to 
detect. They also eluded the prohibitions by navigating trade through the 
French West Indies.258 However, this was not always a safe measure as 
French officials attempted to prohibit the import of American goods, 
particularly flour. In 1785 for example numerous raids of stores took place 
in Martinque and Guadeloupe searching for American flour after thirty 
American vessels were seized in the French territory. The success of 
the combined force of each of these tactics may help explain the recording 
of 635 US ships and 439 French West Indian ships in British West Indian 
ports in 1785.260 
* * * 
The Treaty of Amity and Commerce or, as it is more commonly called the 
Jay Treaty (1796) occupies a contested place in American history. It 
represents the apogee of the lobbying and subversions of British 
navigation policy and exemplifies the important role merchants, some of 
whom were former loyalists, played in the shaping of an American 
commercial policy. In the spring of 1793 within the context of the Anglo-
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French war, Britain decided certain raw food materials were contraband 
and prohibited any vessels from supplying French islands in the West 
Indies with corn, flour or meal. 
Such restrictions however, were secret; American politicians, merchants 
and sailors were not privy to these developments until March of the 
following year when the news became public by which time the Royal 
Navy had seized 300 American ships in the West Indies.262 
This behaviour, according to the Treaty's most recent historian 
Todd Estes' made a diplomatic mission to Great Britain inevitable. As the 
chosen American delegate, John Jay had the unenviable task of negotiating 
a treaty that would meet the demands of the American merchants. The 
tension building since the Treaty of Paris (1783) found diplomatic 
articulation in the guidelines given to John Jay. American shipping and 
trade rights to the Caribbean was one of only two non-negotiable clauses 
from the American perspective. The Americans requested open rights to 
trade with the West Indies using American vessels. Britain answered these 
demands in Article 12 of the treaty, which stipulated that American vessels 
were free to trade in any port. Critically, the article included a caveat 
which insisted only vessels under 70 tons would be permitted. Americans 
interpreted this caveat as a "severely limiting" qualification and an insult 
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to an independent nation trading in the international market. After 
thirteen years of unsatisfactory navigation relations, the American 
politicians refused to accept halfway measures and they never ratified 
article 12. 
The contested twelfth article of the treaty opened the floodgates to 
a wave of Anglophobia fought out in the press and pamphlet literature of 
the period. Republicans such as Benjamin Franklin Bache a newspaper 
editor, and John Beckley, a political aid lambasted Jay and the so-called 
"British Treaty" for submitting to the ex-imperial power. In his newspaper 
the Aurora, Bache declared, "It is time Americans had done with humbly 
petitioning the British court to do them justice." Beckley interpreted the 
treaty's terms as an attempt to undermine American independence and 
worked to shape public opinion to denounce George Washington for 
supporting the treaty as an "indelible character in charge of a British 
faction."265 Despite widespread support for the anti-treaty movement, the 
Federalists ultimately overcame the vitriol and both nations ratified Jay's 
Treaty in March 1796. 266 
It was the merchants support for Jay's Treaty in the big port cities 
of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia that cemented its success. James 
Watson, a merchant of New York counselled his fellow citizens to 
examine the treaty carefully and make a measured analysis based on 
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evidence rather than hearsay. In July of 1795, merchants held a rally in 
support of the treaty at Tontine Coffee House and New York and 
Bostonian merchants followed suit in August. Philadelphia's merchant 
class even composed a public address to the President on the topic, urging 
him to ratify for the sake of American commercial prosperity. 
Unfortunately, there are no firm links between these merchants and those 
of the pre-revolutionary era. However, Wallace Brown's identification of 
the loyalists as a commercial class and the findings in chapter one on the 
importance of economic viability for post war reintegration encourage 
speculation that the loyalists continued to act as merchants and traders. 
Despite the paucity of sources to provide concrete evidence, this chapter 
does demonstrate the continuities in ideology and hostilities between the 
colonial and national period. The question of navigation as a signifier of 
power and control persisted throughout the transition period from colony 
to nation. It provided the locus around which Americans, Britons and 
American Loyalists reconfigured their relationships and provided an 





A Literary Reincarnation; The First 'Un-Americans' in Popular Print 
Culture 1820-1850 
Finding refuge from his loyalist-hating neighbours in Boston in 
1774, Massachusetts-born Benjamin Thompson narrowly escaped 
punishment at the brush stroke of the tar and feather.268 North Carolinians 
were not too fond of him either; as the leader of a loyalist regiment, he was 
the "devil incarnate."269 Yet, in 1833, Godey 's Lady's Book celebrated him 
as an "eminent self-taught American" alongside Benjamin Franklin and 
270 
Benjamin West. Daniel Leonard experienced a similar fate when 
punished for denouncing the Committee of Correspondence as the 
"foulest, subtlest, and most venomous thing."271 Upon his death in 
Massachusetts in 1829 however, the Salem Gazette remembered him with 
respect and high praise as a "distinguished citizen of Bristol County," a 
"Refugee for the loyalist cause" and a valuable progenitor of the iron 
industry.272 
In 1774, the New England Committeemen condemned Thompson 
and Leonard's behavior as "inimical" to the American cause. 
Consequently, they were classified as "conspicuous" Tories and therefore, 
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according to the terms defined in the Test Act (1777) banished into exile. 
Thompson and Leonards' subsequent reappraisal in popular print culture 
in the 1830s further complicates the classification of the American 
Loyalists delineated in the previous chapters. According to the categories 
outlined in Alexander Hamilton's Phocions' Letter for example, were 
Thompson and Leonard considered to be "aliens" or "disloyal citizens?" 
Thompson and Leonards' metaphorical rebirth as worthy American 
citizens provides an access point to assess what happened to the internal 
exiles that remained in the United States and the loyalist refugees in the 
West Indies to enable this transformation to take place. 
This chapter examines the perception and memory of loyalists in 
popular print culture at a time when America found itself in a new struggle 
with Great Britain. The way loyalists were remembered and rehabilitated 
reinforced the perception of the War of 1812 as the Second American 
Revolution. The memory of loyalists served a dual function: to provide a 
model for Americans to define their national identity against and in so 
doing demonstrated the process of earning American citizenship based on 
merit. 
*** 
The questions of navigation and naturalization that dominated the 
political commercial landscape in the 1780s and the 1790s collided in the 
middle of the Atlantic Ocean in June 1807. In search of three alleged 
deserters of the British navy, the frigate Leander fired on the American 
85 
vessel, the Chesapeake. Newspapers reported the American outrage at the 
incident because Britain and America were not at war and there was no 
legal justification for the attack. Untangling the two key issues at the heart 
of this incident exposes the continued hostility between Britain and 
America throughout the early nineteenth century. The Leander-
Chesapeake conflict provides an opportunity to analyze the meaning of 
American citizenship and the development of national identity in the Early 
Republic. 
The Leander attacked the Chesapeake in June 1807 to express 
British frustration with the proliferation of British deserters to the 
American navy. Specifically, the attack was a reaction against the leniency 
of American naturalization laws that enabled so many British sailors to 
defect and evade capture because they qualified for American 
protection.273 Yet the foundations of the "lenient" naturalization law of 
1805 were grounded in the period of internal conflict throughout the 
1770s. The civil war dimension of the Revolution laid the groundwork for 
the basic principles of naturalization law that lasted until the 1860s. 
At the heart of naturalization was the notion of "volitional 
allegiance." It resolved the problem of an individuals' legal identity after 
the Revolution by fore-grounding residence as the determiner of loyalty.274 
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In 1795, the states continued this principle and agreed that an individual 
must live in the United States for a period of at least five years before 
becoming a naturalized citizen. Indeed, legal historian James Kettner 
observes that, "at the heart of the naturalization process remained the idea 
that a prolonged term of residence was the surest way of guaranteeing an 
alien's attachment to the country and adoption of its ways."275 
Additionally, the 1795 Naturalization Law retained the oath of allegiance 
and required applicants to renounce their commitment to any other nations 
or monarchs as well as relinquish any titles of nobility.276 At this time, it 
was clear that the same anxieties over the qualifications for citizenship 
expressed in 1783 fueled the debate over the same issues in 1795. The 
difference in 1795 was that the debates about qualifications were informed 
as much by practical necessities as by the fear of internal enemies. In fact, 
Kettner shows that the debates in the 1790s did not reflect either interest or 
concern for loyalist exiles.277 Time and location were thus persistent 
factors in measuring an individuals' loyalty but also in healing the wounds 
caused by internal dissent. The residency requirement reflected the belief 
that "time alone could insure that those imbued with "foreign principles" 
had the opportunity to assimilate the habits, values and modes of thought 
necessary for responsible participation in a virtuous, self-governing 
republican community."278 Kettner's observation demonstrates that after 
Kettner, American Citizenship, 246. 
Kettner, American Citizenship, 246. 
Kettner, American Citizenship, 242. 
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1795 the naturalization law did not apply to loyalists. As Americans, 
loyalists had never been "imbued with foreign principles" and were 
therefore already considered well qualified for citizenship. Peter van 
Schaack for example, returned from exile and regained his citizenship as 
early as 1784.280 Jacob Duche gained his Pennsylvania citizenship in 1790. 
Just one year prior Samuel Shoemaker also acquired his citizenship in the 
same state.281 In the final analysis, American law classified the Loyalists 
who stayed in the United States after independence as "disloyal citizens" 
rather than aliens. They were therefore already citizens of the United 
States; they did not need to become 'naturalized.' 
The legal status of the loyalists was thus resolved by 1805. But the 
Leander affair represented the climax of the other tensions building 
between Britain and America since the Treaty of Paris (1783). After the 
failure to secure open trading rights to the West Indies in 1783 and again 
in 1796, Americans continued their quest for a beneficial commercial 
treaty with Great Britain. In the interim period, the 1794 ordinance 
governed the terms of American trade to the West Indies. The ordinance 
allowed American vessels to trade goods between the West Indies and 
Europe but only if the cargo was 'reexported' via a U.S. port.283 In theory, 




 Norton, British-American, 247-248. 
Kettner, American Citizenship, 213. Norton, British-Americans, 7 
Norton, British-Americans, 7, Kettner, American Citizenship, 213. 
Henry Van Schaack, The Life of Peter van Schaack, 345, Kettner, 189. 
283
 Donald Hickey, War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 
1989) 14, Rossignol, The Nationalist Ferment, 171. 
88 
the U.S. and then continued onto Europe. In practice, American captains 
chose to dock in the U.S. and avoid import duties by getting new 
documents and keeping the goods on board ship. This practice was 
reminiscent of similar subversions against British restrictions in the 1790s 
and was worth $60 million by 1805.284 In a series of events, which mirror 
the run up to the Jay Treaty, the British navy seized American ships 
conducting this trade and formalized their prohibition of the reexport 
system in the Essex ruling of 1805.285 Once again, Americans felt slighted 
and undermined by the British restrictions. In his capacity as Ambassador 
to Britain, James Monroe observed, "in respect to the ministers of other 
powers we appear to hold the lowest grade."2 6 
The carrying trade issue converged with the issue of naturalization 
in the dispute over British impressments of American sailors. Attracted by 
higher pay and better working conditions British sailors made up about a 
quarter of the crew on American merchant vessels. In a bid to reclaim 
their subjects, the Royal Navy employed press gangs to board American 
merchant vessels and "press" British men into leaving. Not only did 
Americans perceive this as an affront to their independence but also 
American citizens were often mistaken for British ones and taken. 
Diplomatic historian Donald Hickey estimates that about 6,000 American 
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citizens suffered this fate in the period 1803-1812. The seriousness of 
this issue is exemplified by the failure of the Monroe-Pickney Treaty in 
1806. Designed to resolve the issue of navigation rights to the West Indies 
the treaty failed to pass the senate because it ignored the question of 
impressments of American sailors. In fact, Jefferson refused to forward the 
terms to the senate, as he knew Congress would not be ratify it. Just as 
the issue of navigation in the 1780s and 1790s reignited revolutionary 
rhetoric, so too the Leander affair caused public outrage. The newspaper, 
the Aurora reported the "young are animated by the highest sensations of 
military ardor, and the heroes of the war are shedding tears of joy at the 
revival of the spirit of the Revolution."290 The combination of navigation 
and naturalization infused Americans with a degree of patriotism unseen in 
the Early Republic. 
Surprisingly, the Jefferson administration's reaction to the crisis 
contrasted with the public desire for war and alienated the merchants and 
planters in the West Indies. Until 1796, the West Indian and American 
merchants united in thought and effort to improve American shipping 
rights to the West Indies. However, Jefferson's decision to enact an 
embargo on trade to force the British to a mutually beneficially agreement 
alienated the West Indian merchants. They actually benefited from the 
reduced competition the embargo caused and therefore supported the 
8Hickey, War of 1812, 11. 
9Hickey, War of1812, 16. 
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metropoles' position. Indeed, according to historian Jeanne Rossignol 
although the embargo "meant the Republican leaders could implement the 
policy of commercial retaliation they had been dreaming of since 1789;" in 
1805 it was outdated and misplaced.292 In the climate of fear and 
Anglophobia generated by these disputes, the memory of those who had 
been disloyal during the Revolution provided literary ammunition for 
patriotic fervor. 
Emerging during a decade of Anglophobia and war fever, the 
debates over American citizenship transitioned from concerns about 
requirements and qualifications to the meaning of citizenship as both a 
legal and conceptual identity.293 Individual loyalists did not actively take 
part in this debate, but the process of remembering loyalists both 
individually and collectively did influence the nature of the conclusion. 
Popular culture achieved this in two ways: first, by re-ascription of the 
term Tory from application to the Revolutions' enemies to the 
Republican's weapon of political insult. Secondly, newspapers promoted 
successful individual loyalists in popular print as exemplars of citizenship 
earned through hard work and merit. 
*** 
To the Young Republic finding its feet on the world stage, the War 
of 1812 represented a re-enactment of their Revolution. Britain once again 
played the role of the oppressive tyrant, intent on stripping America of her 
Rossignol, Nationalist Fermetn, 184. 
Kettner, 232. 
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liberty and freedom.294 Use of the label "Tory" proliferated vigorously 
within the context of internal crisis. From Rhode Island to Louisiana, 
newspapers began to trace its origin to mean "Irish robber" or "murderer," 
and at the height of the War the Alexandria Herald likened Tories to 
"Canker worms...incessantly gnawing at the tree of liberty." The use of 
"Irish" associated the term "Tory" with the negative notion of the "other:" 
something different to be feared and reviled. The correlation of Tories 
with animals was a legacy from the Revolutionary period, when 
newspapers debased and defiled the British and loyalist enemy by 
presenting them as chickens, asses, vultures and geese.295 The 
Washingtonian echoed the same sentiment in February of 1812 when the 
reporter advised holding Tories over fires to "smell them out." 2% Just as in 
the Revolutionary period, such articles implied that Tories were 
subhuman, and certainly not American. However, in 1812 the implication 
was metaphorical rather than real. It expressed not only a sense of 
frustration but also patriotism in response to the British attacks on 
American shipping rights. 
There were similarities between the impact of the term "Tory" in 
1812 and the effect of the loyalists' presence in the 1780s. In 1784, the 
loyalists provoked partisan differences in New York and Philadelphia 
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between those who favored a conciliatory approach, such as Alexander 
Hamilton and those who advocated retribution. In 1812, the Republicans 
recycled the term Tory and used it against the Federalists as a rhetorical 
insult. In doing so, the Republican party encouraged the voting public to 
perceive the Federalists' as the "British Party" and thus as contemporary 
villains of American sovereignty. For example, even before War broke out, 
the American Mercury likened the Federalists' opposition to the conflict to 
Benedict Arnold's treachery in 1775. The article adopted a sarcastic tone 
to reinforce the link between the Federalists' current support for high taxes 
with the dispute over enforced taxation that sparked the Revolution. 
Recalling the volatile taxation issues from the Revolution allowed the 
Democratic-Republicans to portray the Federalists as enemies to American 
liberty and sovereignty. The American Mercury warned its readers that 
"An enemy within is equally fatal now as in 1775.. .He who is not for us is 
907 
against us." In addition, The Investigator articulated the use of Tory 
towards Federalists most explicitly and simply, 
We understand that great exceptions are taken to the name Tory, by which we 
choose to designate the people who call themselves Federalists, Friends of 
Peace. If we knew any other name more appropriate, we would certainly gratify 
these gentleman. But as we do not...we must...use the word Tory until a better 
can be found. 
The reporter stated explicitly why the term Tory was so appropriate; it 
referred to enemies of their own country, someone who supported the 
American Mercury, No Headline, January 1, 1812. 
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British right to taxation, and submitted in the face of British tyranny. 
Federalists responded by attempting unsuccessfully to use the association 
to their advantage. In a satirical poem in the Northern Whig the poet 
affected a Democrat's mocking tone and denounced the Federalist 
opposition as simply "stories/Forged by a gang of Tories." 2 " The reporter 
concluded by warning of the desolation war would cause. He urged that 
the Federalists' 'stories' ought to be taken seriously to avoid the potential 
crisis. Both of the above articles highlight how popular the term "Tory" 
was by 1812 and illustrate the real partisan divisions it caused. 
The Federalist defense reflects how powerful "Tory" was as an 
insult to the party. In a serious article published in the Baltimore Federal 
Republican and reprinted in at least one other newspaper in Virginia the 
reporter went to great lengths to refute the charge of British influence on 
the Federalist Party. The article listed evidence meticulously and endlessly 
to contest the charge. It especially highlighted the Federalists' opposition 
to the Jay Treaty (1796). This was a particularly powerful example 
because most Americans perceived Jay's Treaty as a symbol of continued 
American weakness in international trade and navigation. The Federalists' 
opposition to the so-called "British Treaty" was upheld as evidence of the 
party's American patriotism. 30° Unfortunately, for the Federalists' the 
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war's end the Delaware Gazette, Washingtonian, Baltimore Patriot, and 
countless other Republican papers still used the term Tory as synonymous 
with being a 'British supporting Federalist.'301 Perhaps the clearest 
example of its persistence was the Independent Chronicle's observation in 
April 1815 that the "American Federalists" needed to disassociate 
i n n 
themselves from the "British Federalists" if they wanted to survive. By 
referring to the Federalists as Tories, the Republican-Democrats 
successfully linked the Federalist opposition to the War of 1812 with the 
British hostility to American Independence. They created the idea that the 
Federalists were essentially un-American, thereby signaling the death knell 
of that party.303 
Despite the demise of the Federalists as a viable political 
opposition, the use of "Tory" continued in the 1830s. Newspaper 
manipulated the memory of punishment for loyalism during the 
Revolution to demonstrate 'Un-American' behavior. Antebellum 
Americans rarely participated in the practice of charivari or tarring and 
feathering in the same way Americans had in the 1770s. Nevertheless, 
when incidents occurred newspapers used it as an educational tool to 
denote the meaning of American citizenship. During the Revolution, 
patriotic Americans celebrated tar and feathering as an "American" 
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invention. By 1825, the Middlesex Gazette saw fit to prove the act was of 
British rather than American origin, citing an extract from an English 
seaman's chronicles to prove it.304 Two years later the Portsmouth Journal 
of Literature and Politics claimed it was "as old as the Crusades."305 In 
1845, the Barre Patriot described the tar and feathering of a citizen to 
reclaim debts as "a real piece of Indian business." This was a deliberate 
effort to minimize its association with the Revolution and present the 
tradition as an 'Indian' rather than American tradition.306 The correlation 
between tarring and feathering as punishment by and for the 'other' was 
reinforced by an article in the Southern Patiot, which described the victims 
of the act as looking like "two African monsters."307 
The selectivity of this memory in the popular press also seems to 
serve an educational purpose for its readers; in 1835, the Natches 
community of Maine took justice into their own hands by whipping and 
then tar and feathering a man they accused of murdering his wife. 
Readers were encouraged to support such actions; they were reassured it 
was a "great day" because the punishment was dealt out by "the most 
respectable citizens of Natches." In contrast, a month later five New 
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England publications expressed disgust when a woman from Onodaga 
County was tarred and feathered as rebuke because her "fame was 
considered doubtful in the village." 309 By 1839, newspapers had 
successfully separated tarring and feathering from its Revolutionary 
connotations. They marginalized it as a British or medieval invention and 
distanced it from 'American' behavior by characterizing it as a ritual 
inflicted only by savages. In this way, newspapers offered its readers 
examples of 'Un-American' behavior: a good citizen was not violent 
towards their wives, nor did he partake in primitve rituals of public 
shaming. Finally, only well-respected members of a community had the 
moral authority to inflict such a barbaric punishment and only for an 
especially callous crime. Such reports worked as moral lessons and 
reflected the meaning of American citizenship as one earned on merit 
rather than inherited status. 
In the 1820s, the Jacksonian Democrats reinforced the use of 
'Tory' with negative aristocratic connotations. Jackson created his 
egalitarian image through his presentation as the 'self-made' man. He 
made direct appeals to the electorate and characterized his political 
opponents as selfish aristocrats.310 Jacksonian Democrats portrayed their 
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opponents as men who attended "Pit Club dinners" instead of representing 
constituents. If Jackson was the "People's President" his opponents had to 
be men "who regard high rent to be peace and high prices to be plenty." 
In popular newspapers, the Democrats ridiculed the National Republicans 
for their placement of hereditary titles over individual merit. As the Times 
and Hartford Advertizer suggested, a Tory is "distinguished for no 
personal quality, he prides himself upon once having a grandfather." 
However, a Tory was not simply someone to ridicule, but a threat to the 
interests of the American public, "He thinks that poor people ought neither 
to write, read, marry.. .They ought always to work." 
An illustrative anecdote that appeared in the same year in at least 
six newspapers further demonstrated Tory as a term of ridicule and 
inadequacy. In reply to the accusation that her husband was a Tory, a 
woman replied, "her husband was one of the greatest libertines in all that 
part of the country."314 The misuse of'libertine' for 'liberty' reinforced 
both the dim-witted nature of Tories, as well as their inability to 
comprehend the meaning of 'liberty,' and thus their fundamental 
ineptitude to represent the interests of most Americans. In addition, a 
'libertine' encouraged readers to link the image of a Tory with that of a 
dissolute, a man without social or sexual morals.315 At least five 
311
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newspapers in New York and Massachusetts reprinted the article, 
indicating the circulation and popularity it enjoyed. The connection 
between Tory as a byword for negative aristocratic characteristics and 
unintelligent animals foregrounds the role it played in educating 
Americans about the expectations and responsibilities of citizenship. The 
presentation of 'Tories' was illustrative of the American concept of 
citizenship as a role that had to be earned and deserved rather than a status 
decreed by a privilege of birth.3 7 
The Bank Crisis of 1832-33 provided an opportunity for the term 
"Tory" to re-explode onto the scene.318 Both the Democrats and the Whigs 
fought in the popular press for the right to denounce the other as Tories. 
For the Whigs, Andrew Jackson's veto was an abuse of his rights 
stipulated in the Constitution and echoed the actions of a tyrannical King. 
The use of "King Andrew" cartoons was common and encouraged readers 
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to equate Jackson's veto as akin to Charles Fs tyranny in England. This 
was a particularly loaded association as Charles Fs tyranny ended with 
execution.320 However, the Democrats alone successfully linked 'Tory' 
specifically and directly to negative images of aristocracy and traitors from 
the Revolution. For example, during the State elections of New York in 
1834 the Salem Gazette sarcastically likened the Whig victory to that of 
the British "and Tories" at Bunker Hill; the implication being a practical 
triumph but neither a moral or a permanent one. Six years later, the 
Hudson River Chronicle denounced the Whig leadership as "quite as 
insolent as their red coat predecessors."322 Such direct references to the 
Tories of the revolution encouraged readers to associate the treacherous 
characteristics of the first 'Un-Americans' with the modern day Whig 
Party. Jackson's re-election after the bank crisis indicates the success of 
the Democrats campaign.323 
In this way, loyalists from the American Revolution, the 'original 
Tories' indirectly retained their place in the national consciousness 
through continued negative use of the term 'Tory.' This demonstrates that 
the Revolution did not define American identity absolutely or statically. 
The memory of the British and loyalist enemy continued to evolve and 
adapt to the changing nature of American society. Popular print culture 
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found a way of reconfiguring the Revolutionary enemy in a contemporary 
context. The revival of the term as a political weapon in the Early 
Republic demonstrated the legitimate acceptance of political disagreement. 
Internal disloyalty in the Revolution was not a crime but a sign of a 
healthy republic. Newspapers reinforced this idea by recognition of 
individual loyalist accomplishments in popular culture in the 1830s. The 
rehabilitation of previously disloyal citizens contributed to the meaning of 
American citizenship as a role that was not just pre-ordained in law but an 
individual earned status. 
* * * 
The metaphorical transformation of Benjamin Thompson, or Count 
Rumford as he was later knighted is the most extreme, and therefore an 
illuminating case for analysis. Thompson was born in America but decided 
to support the Crown during the Revolution. Historian Robert Munro 
Brown argues that Thompson's loyalism was motivated as much by self-
interest as genuine political affiliation. Brown asserts Thompson "swore 
allegiance to whichever side was most profitable to him."324 In contrast, 
his biographers adopt a more positive characterization that illustrates the 
complexity of Thompson's character. Regardless, the vilification of 
Thompson by his contemporaries in 1774 testifies to his unpopularity. 
Hiding first in Woburn, Charleston, and finally, Boston, the 
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Committeemen arrested Thompson in May of 1775, "upon suspicion of 
being inimical to the liberties of this country."326 Although the local 
Committee of Safety acquitted him, Thompson left America for England, 
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never to return as a permanent citizen. 
New Hampshire's Alienation Act of 1778 listed Thompson as one 
of many American loyalists ordered to leave the State, relinquish his 
property, and return only upon pain of death. New Hampshire 
newspapers printed the Act in full to ensure that all residents knew the 
local law would enforce a $500 fine to anyone found assisting any of the 
proscribed men. In fact, the state legislature contravened Article V of the 
Treaty of Paris by selling Thompson's property. Newspapers advertised 
the sale alongside many others and were neither reactionary nor emotive in 
style. This indicates how common such advertisements were and suggests 
many loyalists lost their property in this way. Indeed, in Massachusetts, 
returning loyalist Samuel Goldbury tried to reclaim £1000 in lost property 
but local residents forced him to retract the claim through "threats on his 
life [that] forced him to hide." Even Frederick William Geyer, a former 
loyalist but awarded citizenship with voting rights in Massachusetts could 
not gain restoration of his property.330 In fact, the Board of American 
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Loyalists in London formed because they knew property restitution from 
the states themselves would not be successful. 
According to the criteria discussed in chapter one Thompson was a 
"real British subject." He left American soil in 1774 before the Declaration 
of Independence and never returned. His location coupled with his 
"inimical" behavior determined his national identity. Despite this, by 1832 
the process of his reassessment in popular print culture was well 
underway. Just a year later his crimes had not only been forgiven, but 
forgotten. For example, in March of 1832 Godey's Lady's Book published 
a very intriguing short story about aristocracy. In the story, Count 
Rumford explored his own role in the revolution, and sought to redeem his 
crimes of "living a trifler [in order to] die a man."332 Just as the political 
newspapers castigated aristocracy, Godey 's portrayed aristocracy 
negatively, although it couched its criticisms in more poetic language. For 
example, it likened aristocrats to polished brass as both "appear more 
valuable than gold." The image illustrates the magazines, (and by 
extension its reader's) criticism of empty aristocratic values. It implied that 
external appearances of wealth and greatness were not accurate reflections 
of a genuine moral character. The use of "valuable" was significant 
because it introduced the idea that states awarded citizenship to individuals 
who demonstrated skill and/or commitment to the prosperity of the nation. 
Rumford was a particularly useful vehicle for this message because he was 
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not born into aristocracy but married into it. This message found full 
articulation in the innocent and lyrical poem at the end of the article. 
Rumford allegedly wrote the poem himself and it conveyed his desire to 
throw off his aristocratic yoke, and aspire to the author's definition of "the 
most agreeable of all companions... .a simple, frank man, without any high 
pretensions to oppressive greatness."333 Rumford's fictional rejection of 
his adopted aristocracy illuminates the understanding of what it meant to 
be American in 1830s: one had to be of simple means and pure ways to 
qualify as a valuable citizen of the American Republic. 
Godey's recognition of Rumford's loyalist and aristocratic past 
paved the way for his forgiveness, and the collective amnesia about his 
past a year later. By 1833, Godey's celebrated the Count as an "eminent 
self-taught American."334 The inclusion of Benjamin Franklin in the same 
article reinforced the notion that Godey 's rehabilitated Rumford not as a 
loyalist or a Tory, but as an American. Significantly, whereas historian 
Eileen Cheng found nineteenth century historians allowed individuals a 
simultaneous loyalist and American identity, popular print culture 
emphasized the latter at the expense of the former.335 For example, the 
New Hampshire Gazette remembered Rumford's "honorable fame and 
exalted greatness" rather than his role as a spy and leader of a loyalist 
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militia.336 It also forgave his support of the Crown by explaining it was a 
practical decision. They suggested the patriot army denied Thompson the 
opportunity to utilize his mathematical skills.337 Moreover, the article 
interpreted Thompson's choice of "Rumford" as a sign of his affinity for, 
and sense of belonging to the Rumford community in Massachusetts. For 
Godey's this was further proof of Thompson's identity as an American. In 
1841, inhabitants of South Woburn named a town in Rumford's honor. 
This testifies to the powerful nature of popular cultures portrayal of 
Rumford as an eminent American. 
Southern newspapers identified Rumford's fame six years later, but 
were no less keen to rehabilitate his American identity over his loyalist 
persuasions. They also emphasized his roots as a farmer's boy in rural 
Massachusetts rather than the aristocrat he became through marriage.339 
The Southern Patriot of Charleston and Houston Telegraph of Texas 
regarded it as their civic duty to inform citizens "it is not generally known, 
as it should be," that the successful, "celebrated" famous Count Rumford, 
"was an American."340 The only qualification he required was his birth in 
America, (though they get the town wrong, Waldo instead of Woburn). By 
1850, the New Hampshire Sentinel had done away with any reference to 
his Tory past, informing its readers that Rumford retired to England before 
336
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the Revolution. In contrast to the rehabilitation of loyalists by 
nineteenth-century historians and novelists, popular print culture 
encouraged not simply rehabilitation, but also a collective forgetting of 
Count Rumford's dishonor during the Revolution. 
In many ways, Rumford is a unique example. His contribution to 
theories of modern science, generous donations to the American Academy 
of Arts and Science and his founding of the Royal Institution of London 
make him an unsurprising figure for rehabilitation. Indeed, his 
reassessment began when he died in 1814 when newspapers remembered 
his scientific and political achievements with high praise and admiration. It 
is significant to note that while eulogies on his death reported he was 
"born in Massachusetts," popular culture did not embrace him as an 
"American" until 1833.343 This seems to reflect the process of becoming 
American; newspapers presented it not as a status or identity instantly 
achieved, but a gradual progression of self-reflection and improvement. 
Coverage of Daniel Leonard's death varied according to region. As 
a native of Massachusetts, the Salem Gazette remembered him warmly and 
positively as a "distinguished citizen of Bristol County."344 The Haverhill 
Gazette's report was more factual as they described him as "a native of 
341
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Massachusetts and a classmate at Harvard College of the late Ex President 
John Adam's."345 However, unlike the Rhode Island American, and 
Maryland's Republican Star, the Massachusetts paper totally omitted the 
information that Leonard "was almost the last survivor of the loyalists who 
were expatriated from the United States for their adherence to the British 
Government." The newspapers' exclusion of Leonard's loyalist past hints 
at Massachusetts collective forgetting of his loyalist identity. Just as Count 
Rumford had earned his right to citizenship by his valuable contribution to 
the world of science, so too Leonard's position as Chief Justice of 
Bermuda and progenitor of the valuable iron industry saved him from 
vilification. 6 
Thomas Hutchinson's unpopularity in the colonies in the build up to 
the Revolution is well known. Yet the man who was burned in effigy on 
the streets of Boston, Philadelphia and Princeton in 1773, that "vile 
serpent" whose treachery was portrayed as akin to Caligula or Nero's, was 
remembered much less severely in the late 1820s.348 Upon publication of 
Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts in 1827, the Salem Gazette 
described it as "valuable," and Hutchinson as a "faithful historian," its 
readers were encouraged to anticipate it with excitement.349 A year later 
the Essex Gazette confirmed that positive response, echoing the "valuable" 
345
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description and proving that the publishers had generated a lot of interest 
and money for "beautiful" volumes imported from London.350 Another 
year later the Baltimore Patriot proved that Hutchinson's History was read 
outside Massachusetts. In fact, the newspaper looked to Hutchinson as an 
authority on the overestimated value of the Spanish currency.351 
While these examples do not suggest that Americans as a whole 
embraced Hutchinson as a 'true American,' or accepted his rehabilitated, it 
does illustrate the 'selective memory' of individual loyalists' past. In 
contrast to the generic use of Tory as a byword for enemy, popular culture 
redeemed individual loyalists based on their actions after the Revolution. 
The rehabilitation of loyalists in memory mirrors the reintegration of 
actual loyalists in the 1780s. In the 1780s, loyalists could earn their 
citizenship by providing useful skills to the new republic. In the 1830s, 
newspaper redeemed them if their post-war actions benefited the image of 
American identity. 
James Rivington was the 'King's Printer' in New York throughout 
the Revolutionary period. Born in England, Rivington was criticized in the 
1770s for his "haughty domineering spirit," his "wicked imagination" and 
attempts to foster discord and disunion through publication of 'lies' in his 
i n 
newspaper. Rivington feared for his life and was unable to return to his 
home or family after a mob acted out their verbal threats and destroyed his 
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printing press. Yet by 1827, a Hartford publication not only ignored his 
loyalist past, but trusted one of his articles on the freemasons from 1770. 
They used it to ridicule the New Haven Journal's claims to a "discovery" 
of the secrets of freemasonry.354 The Salem Gazette drew on his work for 
similar purposes in 1836. The Gazette undermined the Boston Journal's 
claim that they were the first to print "the traitor" Major Andre's infamous 
poem.355 Moreover, in 1839 the Houston Telegraph delighted in printing 
an anecdote from the Revolution that encouraged forgiveness of 
Rivington's past. The story traces the character of Ethan Allen, a staunch 
patriot who described Rivington as an honest and honorable man. Allan 
enjoyed an evening of drinks with the Tory and fostered a memory of 
Rivington as a good sport rather than a publisher of royalist propaganda.356 
Again, treatment of Rivington was by no means effusive by 1839, nor was 
he regarded as American. However, his role as the King's Printer, which 
the revolutionaries once considered a great threat to American liberty and 
freedom, was minimized and largely forgotten in favor of using him as 
figure of knowledge and an example of a "good sport." 
In contrast, newspapers emphasized and demonized the loyalist 
past of Donald McDonald. McDonalds' infamy was well known. During 
the Revolution, he fought for the Crown, not in the traditional "redcoat" 
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sense but rather as the leader of a band of bloodthirsty Indians. Seventy-
two years after the actual event the Maryland Sun remembered 
McDonald's most famous and gruesome attack.358 The event centered 
around McDonald's failed attack on the house of a patriot family. The Sun 
described McDonald as a "white scoundrel" who used tomahawks as 
weapons and "held rebels on pitchforks over fires." The reader was 
encouraged to regard McDonald as of the "animal order," emphasized by 
the barbaric weapons he carried and the Indian company he kept. In 
addition, the article portrayed McDonald as rather dim-witted. In the 
conclusion of the story, Shell the patriot captured McDonald as one would 
a defenseless animal; "He at once seized the astonished and all but 
exultant Tory and drew him into the house, and before any of the gentry 
outside knew the transaction, McDonald was aprisonerV Indeed, the 
adjacent but apparently unrelated article, "A Dumb Man's Wit" seems 
strategically placed.359 For this generation of Americans more removed 
from the Revolution than those of earlier decades, likening Tories to 
contemporary understandings of 'otherness' (Indians) helped to exemplify 
the meaning of Un-American behavior. It provided a stark contrast to the 
valuable and virtuous citizens like Rumford and Leonard and therefore 
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Sun, "Eventful Death of a Tory from the Revolution," December 16, 1847, 1. 
Sun, "A Dumb Man's Wit", December 16th, 1847, 1. 
110 
helped clarify the meaning of American citizenship by providing someone 
to define it against.360 
In contrast to the restoration of loyalists like Rumford, Leonard, 
Hutchinson, and Rivington, McDonald's vilification suggests that 
ideological opposition was valid but violent disagreement was 
unacceptable. In addition, McDonald's actions and values counseled 
readers on the role of the American citizen as one they had to earn or 
achieve, rather than a natural right by birth. While both Rumford and 
McDonald were born on American soil, newspapers forgot and forgave 
Rumford's loyalist past because he redeemed himself by rejecting his 
noble title (however fictional) and contributed knowledge and value to the 
world of science. McDonald on the other hand displayed savage, ill 
thought out and irreverent characteristics and Shell killed him before he 
had opportunity to reform his ways. 
Despite his demise both literally and figuratively, Donald 
McDonald lived on in print in an equally derogatory and 'Un-American' 
context. Four years after the publication of McDonald's eventful death, 
Godey 's Lady's Book featured a short story entitled "The Cave of Eigg" 
which featured a Donald McDonald as a "hard and stern" Scottish 
chieftain, humanized only by the love for his daughter.361 Other parallels 
360
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exist between the McDonald of Revolutionary fame and that of Godey 's 
fiction; both were leaders of a small and unruly band of "savages" and 
better men knocked from their self-appointed presumptions.362 James 
Beattie and D'Assigny's theories on the formation of memory in the 
human mind provide an eighteenth-century context to explain the effect 
the conflation of images had on the reader.363 D'Assigny's memory theory 
is instructive; he contended that memory was enhanced by definition 
against opposites, "when we represent to ourselves Sobriety and 
Temperance, we cannot but have a notion of Debauchery and 
Intemperance."364 Indeed, using D'Assigny's theory, the authors' 
emphasis on savage characteristics and cruel behavior with associations of 
McDonald as an enemy to liberty in the Revolution would inspire readers 
to position their own identity in absolute opposition; not savage but 
civilized, not merciless but kind and forgiving, not a Tory or a Brit but an 
American citizen. 
*** 
Popular print culture mirrored the sympathetic reassessment of 
loyalists in nineteenth century historiography.365 In these widely read 
publications loyalists earned their status as American citizens through a 
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gradual process of redemption. Americans embraced Benjamin Thompson, 
later Count Rumford as a fellow citizen after Thompson's rejection of his 
aristocratic title and recognition of the superiority of his humble heritage. 
In addition, newspapers emphasized his success and valuable contribution 
to the Republic to provide a model of the virtuous American citizen. 
Daniel Leonard's 'Americanization' by his native town was only possible 
because of Leonard's intellectual, financial and political success. For 
Hutchinson the press' depiction was more ambiguous. Newspapers did not 
challenge his value as an historian but they did not explicitly redeem his 
personal character. Nevertheless, the American press eventually forgot his 
loyalist past to emphasize the gradual process of becoming a useful 
American citizen. James Rivington had always been a colorful personality, 
and the newspapers of the Early Republic enjoyed his entertaining 
character more than they cared for his allegiance during the Revolution. 
As Rivington had been born in England the goal was not to create an 
American but rather humanize one of the original enemies, thereby 
minimizing their current threat to American liberty and freedom. 
McDonald provided an example of the 'other,' an anomaly from which 
American readers were conditioned to define themselves against, through 
the different established representations of "Tory." 
Analysis of newspapers from the Early Republic indicates the 
significance of popular print culture's presentation of loyalists. They 
provided a model to help demonstrate what it meant to be American and 
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how an individual earned meritorious citizenship. By 1805, American law 
defined the terms for becoming an American citizen. After 1805, the 
rehabilitation of loyalists in print mirrored the ongoing debate about the 
cultural and social meaning of an American identity. The first "Un-
Americans" were not redundant in the formation of an American identity, 
nor was their role a purely negative one. Rather, the memory of those 
original Tories acted as a vibrant image to help Americans make sense of 
the social and political roots of the New Republic. In contrast to the 
traitors and aristocratic imbeciles from the Revolution, Americans were 
encouraged to aspire to become self-made men, who sought reward and 
respect based on merit and hard-earned labor rather than pre-determined 
status. Americans valued loyalty, honesty and communal prosperity over 
self-interest. Of course, the idea that American citizenship demanded such 
values and virtues is not surprising. But the original and re-incarnated 
Tories played a crucial role in shaping and disseminating the meaning of 
American citizenship offers an additional perspective. The contrasting 
images of Count Rumford as the redeemed traitor with McDonald, the 
epitome of everything "Un-American," perhaps serve the most powerful 
representation of the dual function loyalists played in the creation of a 
unique American national identity. 
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Conclusion 
The Treaty of Paris (1783) ended the problem of dual allegiance. The 
Treaty defined loyalists as either "real British subjects" or disloyal American 
citizens based on the individuals' active choice. In practice, local communities 
still distrusted former loyalists and discriminated against them throughout the 
1780s. Citizens in the new republic identified economic viability as a solution to 
the problem of dual allegiance. Individuals like Tench Coxe and Peter Van 
Schaack earned their right to American citizenship by offering economic 
prosperity and useful skills to their community. Naturalization Laws in 1790, 
1795 and 1805 formalized again the legal definition of American loyalists by 
including them as full American citizens. 
Interestingly, newspapers mirrored the informal qualifiers for citizenship 
in the 1830s. Print culture rehabilitated individual loyalists as Americans to 
demonstrate the meaning of American citizenship. Readers learned that 
citizenship was not just a de facto right of birth but a status deserved through hard 
work and individual merit. The problem of dual allegiance translated into a "dual 
function" in popular print culture in which loyalists acted as role models of civic 
virtue and supplied negative images to define an opposite to American identity. 
Loyalist merchants in America and in the West Indies remain elusive. 
Future studies can develop knowledge of these key players through archival work 
in the port records of strategic import/export towns. Philadelphia seems like a 
fruitful place to start. Increased information about these men will further 
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illuminate the problem of dual allegiance in the Early Republic. A study of this 
nature can also strengthen the links historians are making between America in the 
early national period and those parts of the Atlantic world still within the British 
Empire. 
Recently, historians have avoided "classifying" the loyalists. Instead, they 
focus on a specific individual or region to examine the meaning of the civil 
dimensions of the Revolution. Political parties in the 1820s and the 1830s 
nullified the classification question by re-ascribing the term "Tory" as a rhetorical 
weapon against political opponents. Examination of the "internal exiles" that 
stayed in the United States after 1783 must first return to Lorenzo Sabine's 
classification method. Compilation of biographic and geographic data of all 
loyalists who stayed will supply a foundation to build analysis that is more 
nuanced and sophisticated. Historians can then mine voting records and property 
documents to ascertain exactly who and how many former loyalists regained 
property and voting rights in the Early Republic. Case studies will be a logical 
and manageable approach. Scholars could select three states that Wallace Brown 
classified as "harsh" and three he deemed "light" in terms of their treatment of 
loyalists in the Revolution. This method would ensure a representative analysis 
and provide an access point to explore the political, legal and cultural dimensions 
of the Early Republic. 
Historians have combated the "scattered" problem of the Loyalists 
effectively. Classification techniques tried to identify patterns in the ideological 
dimensions of loyalism but satisfactorily concluded it was indefinable. Studies of 
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loyalists in exile are numerous and extensive. They successfully use the scattered 
geographic nature of loyalism to examine the impact of the Revolution on the 
larger British Empire. Sections of this thesis suggest that because the loyalists 
spread out geographically after the Revolution this aspect of the "loyalist 
problem" actually economically benefited both the United States and other parts 
of the Atlantic world in the early nineteenth century. 
The problem of the loyalists continues to animate current historiography. 
Historians are armed with the knowledge that the loyalists were as "American" as 
their rebel peers, and have subsequently broadened their historical focus and 
approach. Interest in the "losers" from the Revolution no longer recovers the 
loyalists to satisfy antiquarian interests but to generate new perspectives on the 
legal, political and cultural history of the Early Republic. 
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